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ABSTRACT 
 
Purpose- The purpose of this study is to make a contribution to the literature on 
compliance with respect to public procurement reforms in developing countries with 
particular reference to Ghana. The research also report on a survey to study factors 
leading to compliance with the Public Procurement Law and how these factors: 
organizational goal achievement; familiarity with procurement rules and monitoring of 
procurement practitioner’s behavior influence compliance with the new Public 
Procurement Law  (Act 663) during the implementation of the public procurement 
reforms program in Ghana. 
Design/methods/approach- A review of the various literature and theory (Principal-
agent theory) resulted in a conceptual model and the formulation of hypotheses to test the 
proposals that there is association between each of the factors: organizational goal 
achievement; familiarity with procurement rules and monitoring of procurement 
practitioner’s behavior with compliance. The research used data from a survey of 58 
responding public procurement practitioners/governmental purchasers from procurement 
entities within the public sector of Ghana. 
Findings- The empirical findings indicate that both organizational goal achievement 
and familiarity of rules by public procurement practitioners have a positive, statistically 
significant impact on compliance. The monitoring of procurement practitioners behavior 
though having a positive association with compliance was found not to be of much 
significance while a fourth factor (used as a controlled variable): intra-organizational 
pressure (denoting the impact that decisions and actions of other staff in the organization 
have on the efforts of procurement practitioners to adhere to the established procurement 
rules) was found to have a significant but negative association with compliance. 
Research limitation- The study is limited in its setting: measuring perceptions of 
public procurement practitioners/governmental purchasing professionals within the 
public sector of Ghana most of whom are located in the southern part of Ghana and are 
more likely to comply than those that may be located in the remotest parts of the country. 
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Practical/managerial implications- Education and training of procurement 
practitioners to be knowledgeable and familiar with procurement rules, regulations, 
processes and procedures will be an effective tool for increasing compliance. Another 
implication too is that every effort should be made to promote goal congruence at the 
organizational level (probably at the personal level too) so as to avoid goal conflict while 
pressure brought to bear on procurement practitioners by other staff within the 
organization with respect to their actions and decisions which may lead to non-
compliance should be avoided as much as possible. 
 
Keywords- Public procurement, Principal-agent, Compliance, Procurement reforms, 
Monitoring, Familiarity of rule, goal achievement, Ghana 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction  
Public procurement is the process by which large amounts of public funds are utilized by 
public entities to purchase goods and services from the private sector (Hunja, 2003). It 
therefore involves the acquisition of goods and/or services at the best possible total cost 
of ownership, in the right quantity, quality, time and place for use by government and 
public organizations via contracts. Since procurement is the means by which public 
resources are spent, improvements within the procurement system by means of reforms 
have developmental impact within the economies of developing countries within which 
such reforms are undertaken. But laudable as these reforms may be, complying with the 
rules and regulations that these reforms seek to achieve becomes a problem.  It is for this 
reason that this study intends to find out whether organizational goal achievement, 
familiarity with procurement rules and monitoring of procurement practitioners influence 
compliance with the new public procurement Act, Act 663 during the implementation of 
the public procurement reforms program in Ghana. 
 
 
The need for an efficient, non corrupt and transparent public purchasing system is one of 
the main drives behind most reforms. So much money1 is spent by developing nations in 
the procurement of goods and services and the need for transparency and efficiency in 
government purchasing has led to the transformation of the purchasing process through 
public procurement reforms. Many developing countries have also realized that a well-
organized procurement system contributes to good governance by increasing confidence 
that public funds are well spent (Hunja, 2003) whilst an equally important reason is that 
they may be a condition for access to foreign markets and therefore incumbent upon the 
                                                 
1
 Nicol (2003) reported that the total expenditure of developing countries with respect to governmental 
purchasing was estimated at 15% of GDP. 
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country seeking access to the foreign market to undertake such reforms (Evenett and 
Hoekman, 2003). Influence from the donor community has also been a factor in urging 
and providing the necessary resources to support reforms as for example the World Bank 
has been an active supporter of procurement reform efforts of almost all of the countries 
where it lends (Hunja, 2003). Public Procurement reforms has taken center stage in many 
developing nations and Ghana is no exception to this new trend as most governments are 
putting much effort into reducing budget deficits and combating corruption (Barden, 
2006).   
 
1.2 Background 
‘Ghana has attempted to address weaknesses in its public procurement process by the 
passage of several financial and legal instruments. These have come in the form of 
constitutional, legislative instruments, administrative instructions and financial circulars. 
In 1960, the Government enacted the Ghana Supply Commission Act which was 
reviewed later in 1990 by PNDC law 245. In the same year, Contracts Act, Act 25 of 
1960 was also passed. In 1976, the National Procurement Agency Decree SMCD 55 was 
passed by the Supreme Military Council. In 1979, another law, the Financial 
Administration Decree SMCD 221 was also passed. All these laws, decrees and 
instruments were meant to provide a comprehensive framework of administrative powers 
to regulate the activities of procurement within the public sector. Unfortunately, none of 
these legal frameworks included the establishment of an effective oversight body to 
oversee the successful implementation of these laws’ (Adjei, 2006)2. The Public 
Procurement Board of Ghana now the Public Procurement Authority3 was established to 
oversee and enforce the Public Procurement Act 2003 (Act 663)4 following the 
                                                 
2
 As delivered in a message by the Chief Executive Officer of the Public Procurement Board, June 2006(  
http://www.ppbghana.org/story, accessed 27.04.08). 
3
 The Public Procurement Board’s name was changed to Public Procurement Authority with effect from 
April 2007 following the publication of Executive Instrument, 2007 (E13) on the Revised Edition of the 
laws of Ghana. 
4
 The public procurement Act of Ghana (Act 663) was given a Presidential assent on 31st December 2003 
and become law from henceforth but the actual implementation of the Act 663 started in August 2004 
according to survey results obtained from the field trip to Ghana in the latter part of February 2008 to the 
early part of April 2008. 
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government’s reformation of the public procurement system in 1996 as an integral part of 
a wider Public Financial Management Reform Program-PUFMARP (Adjei, 2006). 
 
Some short comings that the Public Financial Management reform identified were as 
follows: 
• Absence of a comprehensive public procurement policy; 
• Lack of legal regime to safeguard the integrity of the public procurement system; 
• Absence of a central body with the requisite capability and expertise to develop a 
coherent public procurement policy; 
• Absence of clearly defined roles, responsibilities and authority of procurement 
entities; 
• No rules and regulations to guide, direct, train and monitor public procurement; 
• No independent appeals process to address complaints from tenderers; 
• No authority to dispose of  public assets; 
• No independent procurement auditing function. 
In view of the above mentioned shortcomings the Public Procurement Act 2003 (Act 
663) was promulgated to act as a new regulatory framework to regulate all government 
and public purchases within the Ghanaian economy. 
 
1.3 Profile of the Public Procurement Authority 
The Act 663 establishes the Public Procurement Authority as the regulatory body for 
public procurement in Ghana. The Public Procurement Authority’s objective is to secure 
a judicious, economic, and efficient use of public funds in a fair, transparent and non-
discriminatory manner while promoting a competitive Local Industry.  
It’s vision is “to have a world class, efficient, transparent, accountable and professionally 
managed public sector procurement system in Ghana which enjoys high level of business 
confidence and ensures consistent attainment of best value for money in the procurement 
of goods, works and services in support of national development and fiscal policies” as 
delivered in a speech by the Chief Executive Officer in a media encounter with the press 
(Adjei, 2006). The composition of the governing board appointed by the President of the 
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Republic of Ghana as stipulated in Act 663 consist of the chairperson, vice chairperson, 
four persons from the public sector, three persons from the private sector and the Chief 
Executive with a board secretary appointed by the board. The board is supported by a 
secretariat of staff to aid in the implementation of its functions.  The Public Procurement 
Authority is itself not involved in the conduct of procurement except that it has the 
authority to approve requests from public procurement entities seeking approval to use 
single source procurement and restricted tendering. The various functions that the Public 
Procurement Authority undertakes are enumerated below (Public Procurement Board5, 
2007): 
• Policy- It is responsible for formulating policy options to help in the regulation 
and development of public procurement in Ghana. 
• Monitoring- It is involved in the monitoring of the various procurement entities6 
as to whether they are complying with the provisions of the Act 663. It is also 
involved in the recommendation of corrective actions that are required and 
referring breaches of the rules and regulations to the relevant oversight and law 
enforcement bodies where appropriate. 
• Regulation and Standards-  It is involve in the recommendation of regulatory 
changes, the issue of standard tender documents and the suspension of suppliers 
who are found flouting the rules and regulations of the procurement Act. It is also 
involved in the management of complaints and appeals. 
• Capacity building and professional development-The Public Procurement 
Authority is also engaged in the professional development of procurement 
professionals and staff and setting the necessary professional standards and ethics 
of the procurement profession. 
• Information management and dissemination- The Public Procurement 
Authority is also involved in the collection and analysis of  statistics on public 
procurement, the maintenance of database of potential suppliers and the use of  
                                                 
5
 Public Procurement Board and Public Procurement Authority are used interchangeably 
6
 The term ‘procurement entity’ is defined to include all government agencies, ministries, subverted 
organizations and parastatal bodies and includes all local authorities, state owned enterprises, public 
universities, schools and colleges and the Bank of Ghana and other financial institutions in which the 
government of Ghana has a majority of controlling interest.   
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it’s website for the publication of tender notices and other related procurement 
information. 
 
 
1.4 Justification of the study  
Public procurement reforms is an interesting issue that requires a careful study and 
research as not much research have been done in that field especially in the context of 
developing  countries. Thai (2001) has this to say: ‘although public procurement is 
perceived as a major function of government, and although governmental entities, policy 
makers and public procurement professionals have paid a great deal of attention to 
procurement improvements or reforms, public procurement has been a neglected area of 
academic education and research’. It is therefore not only important for more research 
efforts into such reforms to see how efficient they have been in meeting the various 
objectives and goals envisaged in their implementation but also to establish the 
relationships between key factors that impinge on compliance in such reform programs  
since public procurement involves the use of public funds. 
 
1.5 Research problem   
The main research question is ‘how does organizational goal achievement, familiarity 
with procurement rules and monitoring of procurement practitioners influence 
compliance with the new public procurement Act, Act 663 during the implementation of 
the public procurement reforms program in Ghana’? 
 
Specific questions under study are therefore enumerated as follows:- 
• To examine the association between organizational goal achievement and 
compliance with public procurement rules? 
 
• To examine the association between familiarity with procurement rules and 
compliance with public procurement rules? 
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• To examine the association between monitoring of practitioners behavior and 
compliance with public procurement rules?  
 
1.6 Organization of the study 
The study is organized into eight chapters. Chapter one covers the introduction and 
includes the background to the study; profile of the Public Procurement Authority; 
justification of the study; research problem and organization of the study. Chapter two is 
made up of the theory review, while chapters three and four are made up of the literature 
on the key concepts in public procurement reforms and   an exposition on public 
procurement in Ghana respectively. Chapter five is made up of the research method while 
chapter six consists of the research framework and hypotheses of the study. Chapter 
seven is on empirical tests and results while chapter eight is the concluding chapter 
consisting of the discussion; conclusion and suggestions for further research.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THEORY REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the main theoretical framework underpinning this study. The key 
theory used to establish the framework for this study is the principal-agent theory. 
Various writers and authors such as Ross (1973); Jensen and Meckling (1976); Fama 
(1980) and Jensen (1983) have at various times contributed to the literature on principal-
agent theory. Others include: Reuschlein and Gregory (1979); Eisenhardt (1988, 1989); 
Bergen et al., (1992); Holmstrom (1979); Arrow (1985) and Rokkan and Buvik (2003) 
just to mention a few. The various contributions of these writers on principal-agent theory 
have one main theme which has to do with the relationship between a principal and agent. 
This chapter therefore looks at the contribution of these various writers and other authors 
to the literature on principal-agent theory and its relevance and application to the study at 
hand.  
 
2.2 Principal-agent theory 
Principal-agent theory deals with the relationship between two actors: a Principal and the 
Agent who makes decisions or takes actions on behalf of the principal (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1988, 1989; Bergen et al., 1992). Reuschlein and Gregory 
(1979) defined an agent as a fiduciary third party who acts in the interest of a single 
principal or constituent group7. Principal-agent relationships exist within firms 
(intraorganizational)8 and between firms (interorganizational)9. It is concerned with how 
                                                 
7
 It can be argued that in some situations an agent could be having more than one principal, for example a 
public procurement practitioner in a decentralized procurement system in a local area could be having the 
local authority boss (in Ghana’s political system could be a district chief executive) and a regional minister 
who also is also acting on behalf of the central government.  
8
 An example of an intraorganizational principal-agent relationship that exist in firms is the manager and 
subordinate relationship and this can be likened to the relationship that exist between say a procurement 
tender committee chairman and a procurement officer.  
9
 An example of an interorganizational principal-agent relationship that exist between firms could be that of 
a buyer and a supplier according to Heide (2003) and this can also be likened to a procurement practitioner  
(buyer) and a supplier of goods, works or services in a buyer-supplier relationship.  
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the principal should design the reward structure for the agent for the principal to fulfill 
his objectives. Jensen and Meckling (1976), defined agency relationship as ‘a contract 
under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making 
authority to the agent’ They argued that if both parties (principal and agent) to the 
relationship are utility maximizers, there is good reason to believe that the agent will not 
always act in the best interest of the principal. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested that 
the principal can limit divergences from his/her interest by establishing appropriate 
incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant 
activities of the agent.  
 
Most literature on principal-agent theory focuses exclusively on the normative aspects of 
the agency relationship that is how to structure the contractual relation (including 
compensation incentives) between the principal and the agent to make choices which will 
maximize the principal’s welfare, given that uncertainty and imperfect monitoring exist 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In applying this theory to the study of public procurement 
in Ghana, the principal can be considered as the government of Ghana while the agents 
are the procurement practitioners. Agency theory has three key elements: agent 
opportunism; information asymmetry and risk aversion. It is also concerned with solving 
two key problems with respect to risk aversion and agency problem (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Risk-sharing problem results from the fact that different risk preferences in the principal 
and agent may lead to preferences for different actions (Ouyang, 2006). Agency problem, 
which is the major focus of the agency theory, has three sources: conflicting goals or 
incentives between the principal and the agent, information asymmetry between the 
principal and the agent and the difficulty in measuring and verifying the agent’s behavior 
and the outcome of the agent’s work (Kiewiet and McCubins, 1991; Ouyang, 2006).  
Literature on principal-agent theory shows that agents have the tendency to pursue their 
own interest at the expense of the principal (Baker et al., 1988; Wood, 1988). 
 
The government of Ghana being the principal, delegates procurement job functions and 
decisions to the agents who are the procurement practitioners at the various government 
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entities (the Ministries, decentralized departments and agencies). The interest of the 
principal and agent at times may not be the same leading to the agents taking decisions 
not in the best interest of the principal and may lead to opportunism (transaction cost 
analysis10) on the part of the agent. In public procurement contracts, this gives the leeway 
for corrupt practices, wasteful spending, in-transparent procurement deals and non 
compliance with the procurement rules and regulations. It is therefore the reason why the 
principal need to design appropriate incentives to induce the agent to behave and take 
decisions that will deliver optimum outcomes to fulfill the objectives of the principal. 
Some of these incentive packages could be wages, bonuses, decision making rights, 
promotions, punishments etc (Halepota, 2005). With respect to monitoring, the principal-
agent theory also assumes that tighter monitoring by the principal should motivate agent 
to increase their effort while the ‘crowding-out’ literature suggests that the opposite may 
occur (Dickinson and Villeval, 2008). Results show that many principal principals 
engage in costly monitoring and that most agents react to the disciplining effect of 
monitoring by increasing effort and complying.  
 
In Principal-Agent relations, the principal is face with two distinct kinds of problems 
according to Jensen and Meckling (1976), one being the fact that the principal engages 
the agent under the condition of incomplete information while on the other hand the agent 
too may have some information that the principal may not have access to in order for the 
principal to be in the position to take appropriate decision during the engagement of the 
services of the agent. Theses problems come about as a result of information asymmetries 
existing between the principal and the agent as the agent do not want to share certain 
information with the principal leading to what is termed hidden information11 (Douma 
and Schreuder, 2002). This phenomenon arises because one party has private information 
that is relevant to a potential transaction but is unobservable to the other party. It is 
therefore the unobservability of this private information that constitutes the essence of the 
information problem and introduces risk to the other party (Douma and Schreuder, 1998; 
                                                 
10
 Transaction cost economies by Williamson (1975, 1985, 2005) was based on an earlier work done by 
Coase (1937) in his famous paper ‘the nature of the firm’. The theory is based on the assumption that 
human beings are boundedly rational and sometimes display opportunistic behavior. 
11
 Hidden information also termed adverse selection can be explained as  when the agent’s characteristics is 
not visible or known to the principal as at the time principal wants to engage the services of the agent. 
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2002). Hence the problem of information asymmetry is one of the important reasons for 
agent opportunism. Agents have better knowledge about their own skill and capabilities 
with respect to what they can do; and not do; how best they can do it and how much 
effort they can put into a task which the principal may not have full knowledge of when 
engaging/hiring an agent. The problem of information asymmetry may therefore lead to 
misrepresentation of the ability of the agent resulting in adverse selection problem. 
Agents know how much effort they can put into a particular task and their work in 
general and how effective they have been than the principal may know also leading to the 
problem of moral hazard. The most intriguing part of it all is that the behavior of agents is 
hard to observe, monitor and measure and therefore though the principal wishes to 
address the information problem, they are faced with the problem of monitoring and 
metering cost (Williamson, 1985). To help solve some of these information problems, 
(Kisser, 1999), suggested: identifying right agents, this is important during the 
recruitment and selection of procurement professional, government purchasers and 
buyers; using various forms of monitoring and adopting negative and positive actions 
with respect to sanctions and incentives respectively. 
 
To sum up, hidden information is usually an ex-ante information problem compared to 
hidden action12 which is an ex-post phenomenon. Hence the main issue is how the 
principal would evaluate and reward the agent’s performance so as to motivate the agent 
to behave in a manner consistent with the principal’s goals and objectives and the type of 
information strategy that should be employed to make such evaluations (Douma and 
Schreuder, 1998; 2002) and this is where the use of contracting is important to reduce the 
possibility of the agent becoming opportunistic but rather help exhibit an optimal 
behavioral output. Eisenhardt (1989) therefore emphasized that the focus of the principal 
–agent literature is on determining the optimal contract and behavior versus outcome, 
between the principal and the agent. In linking this to the study at hand it is expected 
according to theory that familiarity or how knowledgeable procurement practitioners are 
of the rules and regulations of the procurement Act coupled with the adoption of the 
                                                 
12
 Hidden action also termed moral hazard refers to actions that parties in a transaction may take after they 
have agreed to execute a transaction. 
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necessary monitoring mechanism stipulated by the procurement Act will help influence 
the way practitioners behave in terms of compliance with the provisions of the 
procurement Act not forgetting the regulatory role of the Public procurement Authority in 
ensuring that practitioners comply with the Act. In summarizing this chapter of the write-
up it is important to note that the principal-agent theory deals with the relationship 
between a principal and an agent and how the principal will design an appropriate and 
efficient contract to govern the relationship and help persuade the agent to act in the best 
interest of the principal for optimum output. The application of this theory to the study at 
hand looks at the principal (government of Ghana) and the agent (a public procurement 
practitioner and/or entity committee) within the new regulatory frame work of public 
procurement reforms in Ghana. The next chapter makes a review of the literature on the 
key concepts in public procurement reforms that underpin this study: compliance; 
monitoring; familiarity and goal achievement and how these concepts are linked to the 
principal-agent theory which has been reviewed in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
KEY CONCEPTS IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REFORMS 
 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter makes a review of some key concepts in public procurement reforms that 
underpins the study and looks specifically at issues with respect to compliance, 
monitoring, organizational goal achievement and familiarity with procurement rule 
within the framework of this study. One can hardly talk about procurement reforms 
without its linkage with these key words/concepts. This is because with any reform 
program that require some form of compliance to bring about the desired change, the 
important questions that comes up has to do with whether the new law is being complied 
with or not? If yes, then to what extent or degree and if no, why? Monitoring is also one 
other important concept since for any reform program, there is the need for monitoring to 
see if the new procurement law is being complied with? What about familiarity? Are 
those expected to comply with the new law familiar with its rules and regulations? Are 
they knowledgeable enough of the processes, systems and procedures? What about goals 
and objectives? Is it difficult to achieve one’s goals (at the organizational level) while 
complying with the provisions of the new procurement regulatory system? It is for these 
reasons that these key concepts: compliance, goal, monitoring and familiarity need to be 
better understood within the context of public procurement.   
 
 Popular search engines such as Google Scholar, Proquest, and Sciencedirect just to 
mention a few were made use of to get a general idea of the literature at hand, after which 
specific articles and literature in Journals and other scholarly publications were 
scrutinized for use in the study. This review also discuses the linkages and the 
relationships that the key concepts such as compliance, monitoring, organizational goal 
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achievement and familiarity with procurement rule have with the key theory, Principal-
agent theory within the framework of public procurement and reform programs. 
 
3.2 Compliance issues in public procurement  
Payan and McFarland (2005, p72), defined compliance as referring to ‘acting in 
accordance with an influence attempt from source’ as reported by Gelderman et al., 
(2006). The concept of compliance looks at the conduct of the regulated actor in 
comparison to the corresponding obligation that the actor is supposed to obey. 
Compliance is usually assumed to have a negative connotation since it is usually 
associated with enforced behavior. This negative connotation of compliance is given 
further emphasis by its definition in the marketing literature as ‘giving in to the wishes of 
a more powerful channel member’ (Hunt et al., 1987, Gelderman et al., 2006). 
Gelderman et al., (2006) equally reported that ‘….an individual accepts influence…not 
because he believes in its content but because he expects to gain specific rewards or 
approval and avoid specific punishments or disapproval by conforming’ (Kelman, 1958). 
In relating this to principal-agent theory, an agent acting on behalf of a principal may be 
forced to comply with the laid down rules since the actor assumes that he/she may be 
sanctioned for non-compliance or rewarded for compliance.  
 
A public procurement practitioner therefore acting on behalf of the government of Ghana 
(principal) is enforced to comply with the regulatory regime of the new public 
procurement Act, Act 663 since the inability to comply may result in the agent being 
sanctioned as mandated by the law. This was evidenced in the assessment report13 of the 
Public Procurement where for ethics and compliance with the regulatory framework, 
Ghana achieved a score of 52.88%  which was considered quite satisfactory in view of 
the relatively short time that the reform process was implemented. It has also been found 
that academic research in public procurement has been very inadequate (Thai, 2001) not 
to mention research with respect to compliance (Gelderman et al., 2006). Most 
compliance research in developing countries are ‘more or less fact finding missions’ with 
                                                 
13
 Public Procurement Board, (2007), ‘Re: Submission of documentary evidence for assessment of MDBS 
PAF 2006-2008’ April, 2007.Unpublished assessment report. 
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sponsorship from bilateral or multilateral donors to benchmark performance of the 
procurement system for which funds were sourced for their implementation and the 
World Bank14 is no exception as it has initiated and sponsored a large majority of such 
schemes in the developing countries. Non-compliance is considered a major hindrance 
when it come to compliance issues since it shows that the directives, rules and regulations 
are not being followed and therefore would be difficult to achieve the objectives of such 
reform programs. The significance of the compliant process can not be overstated in that 
it helps determine if the procurement of goods, services and works are done efficiently 
and economically. It also helps to assess if the procurement process is being undertaken 
in accordance with the rules and regulations as pertaining to the regulatory framework 
within which the reform takes place. The compliance process also helps in identifying 
weaknesses within the procurement system and how to take corrective measures so as to 
correct deficiencies within the system. The enforcement of the rules and regulations, the 
reward of incentives and the sanctioning of practitioners is deemed to influence 
compliance rates or the degree to which public procurement practitioners/governmental 
purchasers comply with the rules.  
 
3.3 Monitoring, familiarity and goal achievement in public procurement  
A useful definition of monitoring is provided by Hellawel (1991) with some 
modifications as: ‘an intermittent (regular/irregular) series of observations in time, 
carried out to show the extent of compliance with formulated standard or degree of 
deviation from an expected norm’. Hellawel (1991) further stated that ‘important in the 
rationale for monitoring is the recognition that a change has occurred, and that 
monitoring is a means of detecting that change; of establishing its deviation and 
measuring its extent, intensity or degree’. Monitoring can therefore be said to be based on 
surveillance and is the systematic collection of data or information over time in order to 
ascertain the extent of compliance with a pre-determined standard or position.  
 
                                                 
14
 The World Bank regularly carries out assessment of procurement systems in the countries in which it 
lends aimed at identifying strength and weaknesses of the entire public procurement sector (Thai, 2001). 
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Monitoring is an essential part of procurement management and control and is linked 
with compliance, performance and behavior. With respect to behavior, the monitoring of 
public procurement practitioners’ behavior is expected to influence the degree of 
compliance due to the fear that non-compliance would lead to imposition of sanction. The 
verification of behavior of the agent by the principal when the principal has sufficient 
information is expected that the agent will more likely behave in the best interest of the 
principal (Eisenhardt, 1989) and therefore the need for a governance mechanism that 
limits the agents self-serving behavior in the form of monitoring is important (Jensen, 
1983). The sanctioning of agents (public procurement practitioners) who do not comply 
and the reward of those who comply in terms of incentives is expected to increase the 
intensity or degree of compliance (Gelderman et al., 2006). Blau and Scott (1962) and 
Murray and Heide (1998) also  argued that in addition to the incentive effect of 
monitoring, monitoring arrangements can also increase member compliance because the 
monitoring process in itself may place uncomfortable social pressure on the agent. Ghana 
for example scored 57.64% for monitoring and control considered very satisfactory 
during the assessment15 of its procurement systems. 
 
Familiarity of rules can best be described as having the knowledge with respect to the 
rules, processes and procedures in carrying out a procurement function. Hunja (2003) 
argued that knowledge is a key ingredient of a well functioning, modern legal and 
institutional public procurement framework and that the lack of it brings about capacity 
problems. How knowledgeable a public procurement practitioner is, is an agent’s 
characteristics that the principal may not have complete information about at the time of 
engagement of the agent by the principal according to the principal-agent theory (Douma 
and Schreuder, 2002). Hence, though the principal may have some information about the 
agent in terms of the agent’s characteristics and capabilities, the principal’s knowledge 
about the agent is limited and incomplete and this is term hidden information or adverse 
selection. It is possible to therefore argue that the human resource base of a reform 
program in public procurement is indispensable for a successful reform and for achieving 
                                                 
15
 Public Procurement Board, (2007), ‘Re: Submission of documentary evidence for assessment of MDBS 
PAF 2006-2008’ April, 2007.Unpublished assessment report. 
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a high degree of compliance since the lack of knowledge or familiarity with the 
procurement rules can lead to non-compliance. Ghana achieved a score of 40.39% with 
respect to human resource16 base of the reform program which may not be considered 
very satisfactory and shows the lack of capacity and knowledge that need to be addressed 
with the necessary training and development. It is important to note that practitioners 
need to be very clear about the various rules and regulations governing public 
procurement, since the lack of clarity can lead to non-compliance. The lack of clarity is 
believed to increase the possibilities of (un)deliberate non-compliance (Gelderman, 
2002).  
 
A goal or objective can be defined as: ‘a projected state of affairs which a person, or a 
system plans or intends to achieve or bring about, could be a personal or organizational 
desired end-point’. Organizations set goals and objectives that need to be achieved to 
realize the purpose for which such organizations were established. For example 
organizations in the private sector have profit making as the main goal and in the 
attaining these goal, they put in place the type of business strategy that will help realize 
those goals. In the pursuit to achieve organizational goals and objectives, there could be 
goal conflict especially in the principal-agent scenario where the principal and the agent 
may have divergent goals or objectives either ex post or ex ante when the principal 
contractually engages the agent. Rokkan and Buvik, 2003 proposed that the lower the 
level of goal conflict the less likely it is that the agent will behave in opposition to the 
interests of the principal. For example, the goals and objectives of the procurement entity 
could be in conflict with what the reform program seeks to achieve or the other way, the 
goals and objectives of the public sector organization could be in conflict with that of the 
procurement reforms thereby making it difficult for the organization to achieve its goal 
while adhering to the rules and regulation of the public procurement law, and thereby 
making compliance with the rules a problem. It is therefore important for goal 
                                                 
16
 Public Procurement Board, (2007), ‘Re: Submission of documentary evidence for assessment of MDBS 
PAF 2006-2008’ April, 2007.Unpublished assessment report. 
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congruence between the principal and the agent17 in order for both to achieve their goals 
and objectives so that the public organization or entity could still achieve its goals while 
complying with the provisions of the laid down procurement rules and regulation. The 
next chapter looks at the procurement reform program in Ghana in detail. It discusses an 
overview of public procurement in general and then goes on to look at how procurement 
functions were carried before the new reform program. It then goes on to discuss the legal 
and regulatory framework of the new procurement system and some procurement 
processes, procedures and principles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 Goal congruence: where the procurement entity or organization has goals that do not conflict with that of 
the principal- the government of Ghana. 
 28 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
AN EXPOSITION ON PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN GHANA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature on public procurement in general and then goes on 
specifically with an exposition on public procurement in Ghana which has to do with: 
‘how procurement functions were organized before the Public Procurement Reforms in 
Ghana’; ‘the legal framework of Public Procurement Reforms in Ghana’; ‘the 
Procurement Cycle’; ‘procurement principles and ethics’ and ‘sanctions for non-
compliance and enforcement of rules in public procurement reforms’. 
 
4.2 Overview of public procurement 
Public procurement has a long history as reported by Thai (2001).  He traced this history 
where the earliest procurement order dates from between 2400 and 2800 B.C with a 
procurement order written in red clay tablet found in Syria. The order was for ‘50 jars of 
fragrant smooth oil for 600 small weights in grain’ (Coe, 1987), while other evidence of 
historical procurement includes the development of the silk trade between China and a 
Greek colony in 800B.C. The importance of public procurement can not be overstated in 
view of the huge financial outlays that are usually involved: Pegnato (2003) estimated 
United States federal procurement figure at around US$200 billion per annum while 
Coggburn (2003) put the combined level of state and local government’s at more than 
US$1trillion. Thai and Grimn (2000) estimated government’s collective purchasing at 
around 20% of GDP while for developing countries, Nicol (2003) put the figure at 15% 
of GDP. Public procurement is therefore an important function of government as the huge 
outlays has a great impact on the economy and needs to be well managed (Thai,2001) and 
secondly, as an important tool for achieving economic, social and other objectives 
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(Arrowsmith, 1998). In view of the importance that public procurement play in both 
economic and social development, the World Bank’s Procurement under IBRD Loans 
and IBRD Credits specifies four major concerns or objectives of public procurement for 
projects funded by its loans as reported by Thai (2001): 
• ensuring that the loan is used to buy only those goods and services needed for the 
project; 
• ensuring fair competition for all qualified bidders from the World Bank’s eligible 
countries; 
• promoting transparency or integrity, and 
• encouraging development of indigenous contractors and manufacturers by 
allowing local buyers to build in a margin of preference for local contractors and 
manufacturers (Tucker, 1998). 
 
In the promotion of transparency or integrity, Barden (2006) posited that transparency 
was important to assure the trust and confidence in the procurement system and that it is 
important to assure vendors that the opportunity to supply goods and services are offered 
on a level playing field while avoiding corruptive influences. Barden (2006) suggested 
that transparency can be achieved by government agencies through the following 
strategies: use of effective advertising; public bid opening procedures; effective bid 
evaluation criteria; independent evaluation methods consistent with the stipulations of the 
bidding documents and the awarding of contracts to qualified vendors having submitted 
the lowest evaluated bid without negotiations. Other strategies included: the publication 
of award results; fair and speedy protest and dispute resolution handling processes and 
the disclosure of signed contracts and prices. Schapper et al., (2006) made a strong case 
for the potential of technology to enhance transparency as noted by other authors such as 
Shadrach and Ekeanyanwu (2003). They suggested that e-commence helps in the 
enhancement of transparency through effective audit for the great volume of simple low 
value transactions while for high value complex procurement processes, the key 
transparency features included: public access to up-to-date policies; information on 
bidding programs; standardized documentation and lodgment of bids; progress of tender 
evaluation and announcement of outcomes. Schapper et al (2006) and Shadrach and 
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Ekeanyanwu (2003) therefore concluded that for high value procurement processes, 
transparency is strengthened through direct public disclosure of all stages of the 
procurement process while low value procurement is strengthened primarily through 
improved audit capabilities. But unfortunately, public procurement reforms programs in 
developing countries do not incorporate the reformation and incorporation of technology 
with respect to e-commerce but mostly the reformation of the regulatory and management 
processes of the procurement systems for efficiency, value for money and compliance. 
This is affirmed by Schapper et al., (2006): ‘….enhanced transparency from the 
application of technology to procurement systems delivers directly what volumes of 
regulations seek to do indirectly and often tenuously’.  
 
4.3 How procurement functions were organized before the public 
procurement reforms in Ghana  
The Ghana Supply Commission18 and the Ghana National Procurement Agency were 
hitherto  the main governmental procurement agencies that were engaged in the 
procurement of all public goods on behalf of government but due to some inefficiencies 
as a result of the lack of qualified personnel, lack of planning for the required goods and 
long delivery times some sector ministries such as the Ministry of Health decided to 
conduct their own procurement functions which lead to some individual procurement 
development programs in theses ministries with some input from the Ministry of Finance 
and some donor agencies (Verhage et al, 2002). It is very important to note that prior to 
the enactment of the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663) there was no 
comprehensive guidance on the scope and procedures for the procurement of goods, 
works and services in Ghana (Anvuur and Kumaraswamy, 2006). For instance the 
procurement of construction works and services had been regulated mainly through 
circulars from the Ministry of Finance. This complemented a set of procedures evolved 
by convention in connection with the control of procurement exercised by the Ministry. 
Central, Regional and District Tender Boards supervised the tendering processes and 
award of contracts within thresholds defined by the Ministry of Finance as reported by 
                                                 
18
 The Ghana Supply Commission is now Ghana Supply Company Limited since January 2000. 
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Anvuur and Kumaraswamy (2006). World Bank projects used the World Bank 
Procurement Guidelines (World Bank, 1985) and the World Bank Guidelines (World 
Bank 1997) for the Selection of Consultants. These arrangements notwithstanding, the 
Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) and District Assemblies (DAs) 
maintained separate lists for the pre-qualification of contractors and use different 
standard conditions of contract for works procurement (Adjei, 2006). World Bank 
administered projects used the International Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC) 
conditions of contract for works contracts and shortlists for the selection of consultants.  
The classification of Contractors by the Ministry of Water Resources, Works and 
Housing were observed to be too general and obsolete and the registration criteria, lists of 
contractors and monetary thresholds were not regularly updated according to the World 
Bank (1996) and (Eyiah and Cook, 2003). Except for major or complex assignments, 
most government-financed architectural consultancy services and project supervision had 
been assigned to the Architectural and Engineering Services Limited on sole source basis 
(World bank, 1996). The shortlists used on World Bank-administered projects for the 
selection of consultants were observed to be repetitive, with the same firms selected for 
civil engineering and building works supervision. Many instances of a single contractor 
buying and pricing all the bidding documents, and of the award of a number of contracts 
(or lots) to the same contractor/supplier, under different contracting names were also 
observe (Crown Agents, 1998; Westring, 1997). Studies have shown that public 
procurement represents about 24% of total imports of this country and apart from 
personnel emoluments, it represents between 50-70% of the national budget (Adjei, 
2006) and thereby contributing about 14% to Ghana’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
This no doubt explains why management of public procurement has assumed a 
significant role in national development.      
4.4 The legal framework of public procurement reforms in Ghana 
The Government of Ghana launched the Public Financial Management Reform Program 
(PUFMARP) in 1996 with the aim of improving the overall public financial management 
in Ghana. In 1999, the Government of Ghana established the Public Procurement 
Oversight Group to manage the development of a comprehensive public procurement 
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reform program. The Public Procurement Bill was drafted in 2002 and this was passed 
into law on 31st December 2003 as the Public Procurement Act of 2003, Act 663 (Adjei, 
2006). 
 
4.4.1 The objectives and scope of the Public Procurement Act 663 
The main objectives of  Act 663 are to harmonize public procurement processes in the 
public service; secure judicious, economic and efficient use of state resources and to 
ensure that public procurement functions undertaken within the public sector are fair, 
transparent and non discriminatory. The Act applies to procurement financed wholly or 
partly from public funds; procurement of goods, works, services and contract 
administration; disposal of public stores and equipment, not forgetting procurement 
financed by funds or loans taken by the government of Ghana, including foreign aid 
funds. The Act 663 however have some exceptions and does not apply to some situations 
such as: where the Minister19 decides that alternative procedures are in the national 
interest; where a loan or funding agreement specifies alternative procedures20  and 
excludes stores management and/or distribution. 
 
4.4.2 Functions of the Public Procurement Act 663  
The Public procurement Act establishes the Public Procurement Board, entity tender 
committees and tender review boards; it specifies rules for procurement methods, 
procedures, appeals by tenderers and disposal of stores; defines offences and applicable 
penalties and also specifies the thresholds in schedules to the Act 663. It also authorizes 
the issues of regulations, which are enforceable under the Act. The Act 663 applies to 
various institutions such as the central management agencies; ministries, departments and 
agencies (MDAs); subverted agencies and governance institutions. Others includes state 
own enterprises; public universities, schools, colleges and hospitals; the Bank of Ghana 
and financial institutions owned or majority owned by government and institutions 
established by Government for the general welfare of the public. 
                                                 
19
 Minister here refers to the Government of Ghana appointed political figure in charge of a government 
ministry for example the Minister in Charge of Finance. 
20
 An example of an alternative procedure could be some aid agreements. 
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4.4.3 Structure of the legal and regulatory framework for public 
procurement in Ghana 
The basic structure of the legal and regulatory framework of public procurement in 
Ghana consists of the Public Procurement Act 663 of 2003; Public Procurement 
regulations, Public Procurement manual; Standard tender documents and Guidelines to 
assist public procurement practitioners. Figure 1; below illustrate the structure of the 
legal framework of the public procurement in Ghana. Under the Act663, regulations are 
issued by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Public Procurement Authority 
under section 97 of the Act. They contain detailed rules and procedures for all aspects of 
the procurement system; the operations of the Public Procurement Authority and the 
procurement entities and the conduct of procurement activities (Public Procurement 
Board, 2007)21.  As part of the legal framework of the Act 663, the Public Procurement 
Board is authorized to issue guidelines and to provide supplementary guidance on 
specific topic22 that are needed to help streamline the conduct of public sector 
procurement in Ghana. The legal framework also covers the issue of standard tender 
documents and manual for the conduct of procurement by the Public Procurement Board. 
The standard documents are issued by the Procurement Board and are listed in Schedule 
4 of the Act 663. The standard tender documents comprises of standard invitation and 
contract documents for procurement of all values and includes standard tender documents 
for goods, works and services. While the manuals issued by the Public Procurement 
Board provides practical guidance and step by step procedures for undertaking of 
procurement functions in accordance with the Act 663 and with standard forms to assist 
in procurement record keeping (Public Procurement Board, 2007). 
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 Public Procurement Board: ‘Role of procurement and legal framework’, short term training manual on 
the Public Procurement Act, 2003(Act 663) Module 1, September, 2007. 
22
 Some specific topics have to do with guidelines on the disposal of public assets, single source 
procurement or margins of preference. 
 34 
Figure 1: Structure of the legal and regulatory framework for Public Procurement 
in Ghana23 
 
 
 
 
 
Public Procurement Act, 2003 
(Act 663) 
Passed by Parliament. 
Establishes the Public Procurement Board as a regulatory body and 
specifies functions of tender committees. 
Specifies outline rules for procurement methods, procedures, appeals 
by tenderers and disposal of stores. 
Defines offences under the Act and applicable penalties. 
Specifies thresholds, which require regular updating, in schedules to 
the Act 
Authorizes the issue of regulations, which are enforceable in the same 
way as the Act. 
 
 
 
Public procurement Regulations 
Issued by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Public 
Procurement Board. 
Contains detailed rules and procedures for all aspects of the 
procurement system, including the operation of the Public 
Procurement Board, Procurement entities and the conduct of 
procurement activities. 
 
Guidelines 
Issued by the Public Procurement Board under the Act. 
Provides supplementary guidance on specific topics e.g. disposal, 
single source procurement or margins of preference. 
 
 
 Standard tender documents 
Issued by the Public Procurement Board in accordance with a 
schedule to the Act. 
Contains standard invitation and contract documents for procurement 
of all values from tender documents to request for quotations. 
Includes separate documents for goods, works and services. 
 
Public procurement manual 
Issued by the Public Procurement Board. 
Provides practical guidance and step by step procedures to assist 
procurement entities to undertake procurement in accordance with the 
Act. 
Contains standard forms to assist with procurement record keeping.  
 
                                                 
23
  Public Procurement Board, 2007: ‘Role of procurement and legal framework’, short term training 
manual on the Public Procurement Act, 2003(Act 663) Module 1, September, 2007. 
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4.5 The Procurement Cycle  
The procurement cycle is more or less a road map of the activities within a procurement 
function. It establishes key activities required at every stage of the procurement process 
while at the same time providing a benchmark for the monitoring and evaluation of the 
process by procurement monitors and evaluators. The procurement cycle model 
emphasizes activities occurring within the entire supply chain and not just procurement as 
shown in Figure 2; though the Public Procurement Act 663 did not stress on the storage 
and distribution functions of the supply chain, the law’s emphasis on the disposal of 
stores, plant and equipment makes it imperative to include all activities of the supply 
chain. These activities consist of the following: Planning; Sourcing; Contracting; 
Contract management; Storing; Distribution; Disposal and Evaluation. 
 
Figure 2: Procurement cycle for goods 
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4.5.1 Procurement planning 
The Public Procurement Act 663 of 2003 provides for the activity of planning under Part 
3 section 21 which stipulates as follows: 
 
‘(1) A procurement entity shall prepare a procurement plan to support its approved 
program and the plan shall indicate: 
 
(a) contract packages, 
(b) estimated cost of each package, 
(c) the procurement method 
(d) processing steps and time 
 
 
(2) A procurement entity shall submit to its tender committee not later than one month to 
the end of the financial year the procurement plan for the following year for approval. 
 
(3)  After budget approval and at quarterly intervals after that, each procurement entity 
shall submit an update of the procurement plan to the tender committee. 
 
(4)  The procurement entity shall send to the Tender Review Board, procurement notices 
for contracts and procurement plans above the threshold stipulated in Schedule 3 for 
publication in the Public Procurement Bulletin.  
 
(5)  A procurement entity shall not divide a procurement order into parts or lower the 
value of a procurement order to avoid the application of the procedures for public 
procurement in this Act. 
 
It’s therefore very important to note that procurement entities need to plan their 
procurement for the coming year by 30th of November of the preceding year, reviewed 
and approved by their entity tender committees and updated every quarter (Public 
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Procurement Board, 2007)24. It is equally important to note that the procurement 
opportunities are to be published in the Public Procurement Bulletin and there should be 
no room for splitting of contracts so as to avoid the application of the procedures 
stipulated in the Act (Public Procurement Act, 663). Hence, during the first phase of the 
procurement cycle, procurement requirements are specified by the user; the strategy to be 
used is decided including ‘make or buy’ decisions; funding decisions are taken; the 
applicable rules and methods25 to use are considered and then a time table for 
procurement process prepared. 
 
4.5.2 Sourcing, contracting and contract management 
The sourcing phase in the procurement cycle follows from the selected method of 
procurement. Activities within this phase include pre-qualification of potential suppliers; 
preparation and issue of tender documents; requests for quotations or requests for 
proposals; evaluation of responses and the selection of the successful tenderer not 
forgetting the fact that negotiations may be required at this stage. A contract then follows 
where a formal contract document is drawn up using the agreed terms and conditions and 
signed by both parties. Simpler requirements may use a purchase order or where 
framework contracts exist, contracting may consist of a call-off order under the existing 
contract. The awarded contract must be managed to ensure that both the buyer and the 
supplier perform their contractual obligations. Activities here may include expediting 
delivery; establishing letters of credit; making arrangements for receipt and installation of 
goods; verifying documentation and making payments. Works contracts on the other 
hand may require technical supervision by an engineer while contracts for consultancy 
services often require the direct participation of the buyer or client organization as is in 
the case of training, technical advice or feasibility studies (Public Procurement Board, 
2007)26 . 
                                                 
24
 Public Procurement Board: ‘Procurement planning’, short term training manual on the Public 
Procurement Act, 2003(Act 663) Module 9, September, 2007. 
 
25
 Procurement methods that can be considered are restricted tendering; request for quotations or proposals, 
single source etc. 
26
 Public Procurement Board: ‘Procurement cycle’, short term training manual on the Public Procurement 
Act, 2003(Act 663) Module 5, September, 2007. 
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4.5.3 Storage, distribution and disposal 
Storage comes in when goods procured are not being used immediately and therefore the 
need to store them to ensure that no damage or loss occurs. The timely availability of 
goods can be very crucial to an organization’s operations27. Goods may require 
specialized storage facilities or may have very limited shelf life so the effective storage, 
handling and management of stock levels are important. Goods in storage need to be 
delivered to their final destination for usage according the requirements of the customer 
or end-user. Distribution may involve complex in-country supply chains with delivery to 
multiple regional stores facilities or end-user sites. There may also be the need to respond 
to varying user demands and to transport goods through difficult environments and 
terrain with very poor infrastructure (Public Procurement Board, 2007). With respect to 
disposal, unserviceable, obsolete or surplus stocks may have to be disposed of and 
depending on the nature of the goods and their condition may be sold by public tender or 
auction, transferred to another public organization or destroyed. It is important to make 
appropriate adjustments to accounts to reflect the value of the goods disposed off and any 
income that may have been generated during the disposal. 
 
 4.5.4 Evaluation of the procurement function and auditing 
It is important for procurement practitioners to evaluate the procurement process to see 
how efficient and effective the procurement processes have been. There is the need to 
identify weaknesses and problems for corrective measures and evaluation may include a 
formal procurement audit. A formal procurement audit is done to give assurance to 
management; to see if objectives are being achieved; it highlights deficiencies28 ; ensures 
compliance with the Public Procurement Act 663; ensures if the regulations are being 
followed to the latter and helps in the discovery of irregularities, fraud, and corruption. A 
formal audit also helps in performance monitoring and improvement and in the 
enforcement of the rules and regulations and subsequent prosecution of those who are 
                                                 
27
 Timely availability of goods is very crucial for example in the case of the procurement of essential 
hospital supplies in hospital logistics. 
28This has to do with the capacity of the people in terms of the skills and knowledge of the people in charge 
of the procurement functions. 
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found culpable of non-compliance with the Act. A formal auditing of a procurement 
process has the following actors: auditors29; the Public Procurement Board; Ministry of 
Finance; stores personnel or donor staff or consultants where donor financing is involved 
(Public Procurement Board, 2007)30.Clause 91 of the Public Procurement Act 663 states 
as follows: 
 
‘(1) The Auditor-General shall conduct annual audits of the procurement activities of 
entities and shall furnish copies of reports on the audits to the Board upon request from 
the board. 
 
‘(2) The Auditor-General shall also carry out specific audits into the procurement 
activities of entities and compliance by contractors, suppliers and consultants with the 
procurement requirements in the Act and regulations made under the Act at the request of 
the Board. 
 
‘(3) The statutory audit of procurement activities may be relied upon by the Board to 
institute measures to improve the procurement system. 
 
The types of audits that can be undertaken are: compliance with policies and procedures; 
value for money; fraud/irregularities which may include forensic auditing and 
performance monitoring. Audits can be carried out pre-contract, post-contract or on a 
continuous basis (Public Procurement Board, 2007)31.  
 
 
 
                                                 
29
 This could be internal or external auditors such as an internal auditing department, the Auditor-General 
or specialized independent professional consulting/ auditing firms. 
30
 Public Procurement Board: ‘Introduction to procurement audit’, short term training manual on the Public 
Procurement Act, 2003(Act 663) Module 24, September, 2007. 
 
31
 Public Procurement Board: ‘Introduction to procurement audit’, short term training manual on the Public 
Procurement Act, 2003(Act 663) Module 24, September, 2007. 
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4.6 Procurement principles and ethics 
The basic objectives of good procurement are to procure the right quality of goods, works 
or services from a reliable supplier in the right quantity ensuring cost effectiveness; 
delivered at the right time; to the right place; in the right quantity and at the right price 
whilst achieving the lowest total cost. In the achievement of the objectives of a good 
procurement system the following factors are of utmost importance: Professionalism; 
Transparency; Value for money; Competitiveness and Accountability. Other factors 
include Fairness; Efficiency and ethical approach to the conduct of procurement 
functions. 
 
4.6.1 Professionalism and transparency in public procurement 
Professionalism is the discipline whereby educated, experienced and responsible 
procurement officers make inform decisions regarding procurement functions and 
therefore can be argued that the role that procurement professionals play in the 
procurement system of the Ghanaian economy is critical to the economic development of 
the country (Public Procurement Board, 2007)32. It is therefore in recognition of this fact 
that one important object of the Public Procurement Board is stated as follows: ‘the 
professional development, promotion and support for individuals engaged in public 
procurement and to ensure adherence to ethical standards by trained persons’(Adjei, 
2006)33. Transparency on the other hand means the application of the same rules to all 
suppliers of goods, works and services and that these rules are publicized as the basis of 
procurement decisions prior to their use. Transparency enables the creation of open, fair 
and transparent procurement procedures. Transparency helps in the growth of in-country 
investments and competitiveness as the public sector is seen as a responsible business 
partner. Transparency is considered one of the best deterrents to corruption and allows 
access to information by the public. 
 
                                                 
32
 Public Procurement Board: ‘Procurement principles and ethics ’, short term training manual on the Public 
Procurement Act, 2003(Act 663) Module 3, September, 2007. 
 
 
 
33Adjei AB, 2006,  
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4.6.2 Value for money and competitiveness in public procurement  
Value for money refers to the optimum combination of ‘whole life cost’ and ‘quality’ to 
meet the customer or the end-users requirement of the procured goods or service under 
consideration and usually reflected in the price of the item procured. The object of the 
Public Procurement Board is ‘to harmonize the processes of public procurement in the 
public service to secure a judicious, economic and efficient use of state resources in 
public procurement’ attest to the value for money principle of the procurement system 
(Public Procurement Act, 663). Competitiveness on the other hand refers to the active 
participation of the private sector and or suppliers in the procurement process through the 
making of procurement information accessible to all; through advertising of tenders; 
sourcing reviews; prequalification and the adoption of transparent procedures in the 
procurement systems. The benefits of competitiveness can not be over emphasized and 
includes potential savings for the economy; increases in the supplier base; and the 
development of the local industries within the economy and thereby eventually leading to 
economic development and poverty reduction.  
  
4.6.3 Accountability, fairness and efficiency in public procurement 
Accountability, fairness and efficiency are three cardinal pillars that procurement reforms 
seek to achieve in that a very fair and accountable procurement system helps in the 
efficient utilization of the state resources judiciously. Procurement practitioners need to 
be very fair in their day-to-day dealings with their suppliers and potential bidders and the 
public at large in order to earn the trust of the various actors within the procurement 
system. Accountability refers to the process of holding an individual or an organization 
fully responsible for actions and functions they are engaged in over which they have 
authority to exercise those functions. The benefits of accountability and fairness are as 
follows: the strengthening of the perception of transparency and fairness; the reduction of 
the incidence of corruption; the development of mutual trust and the fact that procedures 
are adhered to for example in all stages of the tendering process. An efficient public 
procurement system has the benefit of being operated in a very timely manner with little 
or no bureaucracy and thereby helping to instill and underpin the trust worthiness of the 
procurement system.   
 42 
4.6.4 Ethical standards in public procurement 
Ethics has to do with upholding moral principles and values which influences our beliefs, 
actions and decisions and involves leading an unquestionable lifestyle especially within 
the professional domain. In the procurement system, ethical standards and considerations 
are very important for the following reasons: procurement staffs are representatives of 
their organizations in dealing with suppliers as likened to principal-agent theory; 
excellent ethical conduct in dealing with suppliers is essential to the creation of a good 
buyer-supplier relationship and the fact that procurement staff are more exposed to the 
temptation of acting unethically than most other employees. 
 
Section 86 of the Public Procurement Act, 2003, requires the compilation and publication 
of code of conduct by the Public Procurement Board and is found in the regulations with 
respect to the following: confidential information; supplier relationship; gifts and 
entertainment and the fact that officials and their immediate families must not sell goods 
and services to their own agency. Officials are not to disclose to any third party 
confidential or proprietary information; officials are to avoid conflict between their 
personal financial interests and their official duties and officials are not to accept directly 
or indirectly any gift34 from any person or entity which has or seeks to obtain a contract 
with their own agency, department or ministry. Section 32 of the Public Procurement Act 
2003 states as follows: ‘ A procurement entity shall reject a tender, proposal, offer or 
quotation if the supplier, contractor or consultant that submitted it offers, gives, or agrees 
to give, directly or indirectly to any current or former officer or employee of the 
procurement entity or governmental authority, a gratuity of any form; an offer of 
employment; or any other thing of service or value as an inducement with respect to 
anything connected with a procurement entity and procurement proceedings ( Public 
Procurement Act, 2003). While regulations 32(2) states that, ‘a procurement entity shall 
record any such attempt in its record of proceedings and immediately notify the Public 
Procurement Board of any attempt to influence an award of contract or performance of a 
contract.  
 
                                                 
34
 Including any gratuity favor, entertainment, loan or other consideration 
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The private sector is not exempted from responsibility to act ethically and transparently 
in procurement proceedings with the Government of Ghana as this illustrated by the fact 
that tenderers are required to sign a formal declaration before being allowed to participate 
in any procurement process: ‘I hereby certify that I and all officers of the company which 
I represent will uphold the highest ethical standards in doing business with the 
government of Ghana. We will not attempt to bribe government officials with money or 
other goods or services; we will not request favorable treatment and we will not seek 
information about competitors or other information regarding the procurement process. I 
understand that if I or other officers of the company which I represent are found to have 
breached this commitment that sanctions will be made against the company, including 
being debarred from doing business with the Government of Ghana for a period of five 
(5) years’ (Public Procurement Board, 2007)35.    
 
4.7 Sanctions for non-compliance and enforcement of rules in public 
procurement reforms  
The adherence to the provisions of the Act and Regulations by public officials is 
obligatory and therefore failure to do so is considered an offence which is subject to 
sanctions. Officials suspected of non-adherence to the rules and regulations and found 
guilty following investigations would be suspended and his or her benefits including 
salary withheld while officials found misappropriating government funds regardless of 
the value were to be summarily dismissed. Hence section 92 of the Public Procurement 
Act 2003, establishes that contravention of any provision of the Act is an offence and 
stipulates the penalties to be applied while section 93 of the Act defines corrupt practices 
in terms of article 284 of the Ghanaian constitution, and the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 
29). The Act also stipulates that any tenderer, supplier, contractor or consultant who 
attempts to influence a procurement process, or the administration of a contract by any 
unfair method, will be subject to sanctions which may include debarment of the company 
from Government of Ghana contracts. Hunja (2003), in reporting on the assessment of 
                                                 
35
 Public Procurement Board: ‘Procurement principles and ethics ’, short term training manual on the Public 
Procurement Act, 2003(Act 663) Module 3, September, 2007. 
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procurement systems in developing countries found out that the abuse of  procurement 
systems arises largely due to weak or inconsistent enforcement of the  prevailing rules 
and regulations. He said that the weak enforcement of the rules was clearly reflected by 
the dissonance between prevailing (formal) rules and what actually takes place in practice 
during the procurement process. Hunja (2003) further argued that public entities usually 
go the extra length to create a semblance of formal compliance with procedural and other 
requirements while seriously compromising the intent and spirit of such rules. 
Ambiguities and gaps in the rules also lead to different interpretations requiring revisions 
and reviews. The lack of enforcement  therefore could be traced to weaknesses in the 
rules and therefore Hunja (2003) suggested a multi-faceted approach like for instance 
strengthening the right of bidders to obtain redress when public entities breach the rules; 
forcing greater transparency into the decision making process36 coupled with other 
institutional oversight mechanisms such as procurement audits. Hunja (2003) concluded 
that the challenge when it comes to the enforcement of the rules and regulations lies in 
achieving a proper balance so that mechanisms of enforcement do not become a barrier 
so as to make the system inefficient, bureaucratic and costly. The non-compliance to 
procurement rules and regulations do not help in the achievement of the objectives by 
which procurement reform programs are implemented and this is therefore considered a 
major hindrance to the effective implementation of such programs. The next chapter 
describes the methodology that was used in the study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36
 Including public notification of contracts through advertisements and use of public procurement bulletin 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed public procurement in general followed by a detailed 
exposition of public procurement specifically in Ghana detailing the legal and regulatory 
framework; the processes, systems, principles and procedures of public procurement in 
Ghana. The preceding chapter is followed by the research method that was adopted in 
this study. This chapter therefore explains the methodology that was employed in the 
study of the problem   at hand: ‘how organizational goal achievement, familiarity with 
procurement rules and monitoring of procurement practitioners influence compliance 
with the new public procurement Act, Act 663 during the implementation of the public 
procurement reforms program in Ghana’. The chapter includes the following: 
geographical area of study;          research setting; sampling and data collection; scope of 
the study; measurement construct; and discriminant validity of independent variables. 
 
5.2 Geographical area of study  
 Ghana is located in the West of Africa, formed from the merger of the British colony of 
then Gold Coast and the Togo land trust territory, Ghana in 1957 became the first sub-
Saharan country in colonial Africa to gain its independence. Its location is on geographic 
coordinates: 8 00 N, 2 00 W with total land area of 239, 460 sq km comprising of 230, 
940 sq km of  land and 239, 460 sq km of water. Ghana is bordered on the east by Togo; 
West by Coe d’Ivoire; North by Burkina Faso and on the south by the Atlantic ocean, the 
Gulf of Guinea. The climate is tropical which is warm and comparatively dry along the 
coast; hot and humid in the southwest and hot and dry in the north. Its terrain is mostly 
low plains with some scattered plateau in the south-central area. Ghana’s population 
stands at 23, 382,848 as at July 2008 estimates with population growth estimated at 
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1.93% (www.cia.gov/library/publications accessed 25.04.08). Figure 3, below shows the 
geographical map of Ghana. The country has ten administrative divisions/regions 
namely: Ashanti; Brong Ahafo; Central; Eastern; Greater Accra; Northern; Upper East; 
Upper West and Western. It has Accra as the seat of government and the capital. Ghana’s 
legal system is based on English Common Law and Customary law while its government 
type is constitutional democracy with the Executive branch headed by the President who 
is the head of government, assisted by his Vice and Ministers of State; the Legislative 
branch currently consist of 230 parliamentarians elected by direct popular vote to serve 
four year term and with the Judiciary headed by the Chief Justice.    
Figure 3: Map of Ghana37  
 
 
                                                 
37
 Source: (www.cia.gov/library/publications accessed 25.04.08). 
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5.3 Research setting 
An explorative study was conducted among purchasing professionals and practitioners in 
the public sector38 of the Ghanaian economy using structured questionnaires39 to survey 
factors leading to compliance with the Public Procurement Law in the collection of 
primary data for this study. Use was also made of unstructured questionnaire to solicit 
information from the Public Procurement Board which is the regulatory body of the 
public procurement reforms in Ghana as mandated by Act 663 of the Public Procurement 
Law. Secondary data was collected from the Public Procurement Board in the form of 
assessment reports and manuals on public procurement reforms in Ghana. ‘Empirical data 
can use quantitative analysis, qualitative analysis, or a mixture of both. Quantitative 
results are expressed in numerical, quantifiable terms. Qualitative results are frequently 
expressed verbally, often to create an understanding of relationships or complex 
interactions, alternatively both methods may be combined’, (Hendrick and Ellram, 1993). 
It can therefore be argued that a mixed method of research design was adopted in this 
study by making use of both qualitative and quantitative methods of research.  
 
5.4 Sampling and data collection  
The sampling was done by randomly selecting a sample40 of sixty-five from a pre-
selected group of two hundred procurement entities recommended from the Public 
Procurement Board to form the basis of the quantitative study. To avoid selecting a 
biased group of entities that may be termed good or bad41 procurement entities since 
                                                 
38
  For the purposes of this study the Public sector consist of procurement entities within the government 
ministries; central government agencies; subverted agencies; state owned enterprises; public universities, 
schools, colleges and hospitals.   
39
 The structured questionnaire was adapted with some changes to the one formulated by Frederick 
Mwakibinga for  the study of  Public Procurement Reforms in Tanzania for his Doctor of Philosophy(PhD ) 
degree.   
40
 A list of public procurement entities forming the sample size of 65 is presented in appendix A.  
41
 The Public Procurement Board had previously done assessment of  100 procurement entities in it’s first 
ever procurement reform assessment and subsequently did another assessment cumulating in the 
assessment of 200 entities covering the period January 1st 2006 to December 31st 2006 using an 
assessment framework termed the Public Procurement Monitoring and Evaluation Tool (PPME Tool). With 
this assessment the Public Procurement Board had a fair idea of entities that have well developed 
procurement systems and capacity and those that needed to improve upon their procurement functions 
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many of these had previously been assessed by the Public Procurement Board, a list of 
‘good entities’ and ‘bad entities’ was formed and theses two groups were randomly 
selected to form the sampling size of sixty-five for the study at hand. The sample of 
sixty-five procurement entities consisted of entities from the various ministries; 
government subverted organizations, and some state owned enterprises; public 
universities, colleges, polytechnics, secondary schools42; polyclinics and hospitals. The 
questionnaires were administered mostly in the southern and central part of Ghana 
covering four of the ten administrative regions/divisions of Ghana. But it is important to 
not that due to limitation of time and logistical complexities in covering all these four 
regions adequately the bulk43 of the sample size actually comes from the Greater Accra 
Region where it was easier moving from one entity to the other during the data collection 
exercise. 
 
The data collection was done by visiting individual procurement entities with a 
questionnaire, introducing one self to the organization and being directed to the 
appropriate department in charge of procurement. Some organizations had full-fledged 
procurement departments while others use the administration or the finance office for 
procurement functions. Questionnaires are left with the appropriate departments and 
personnel in charge of procurement for the necessary responses to be entered into them 
and completed questionnaires subsequently collected latter upon appointed time of 
collection. Some organizations also grant face to face interview where the various 
questions are asked while the procurement practitioner make the necessary responses 
which are instantly entered onto the questionnaire. In such instances some qualitative 
data was also collected from such face to face interview sections. Sixty-five (65) 
structured questionnaires were therefore dispersed to sixty-five public procurement 
entities and fifty-eight (58) completed questionnaires were retrieved representing 89.2% 
responses. The high percentage of responses was achieved as a result of frequent and 
                                                                                                                                                 
forming the basis of the pre-selection of entities before the final sample size of sixty-five was randomly 
selected. 
42
 Now termed senior high school, as at the time of undertaking this study. 
 
43
 Out of the sixty-five entities, fifty of the entities visited were in Accra, and five each in Takoradi, 
CapeCoast and Kumasi. See appendix A. 
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persistent visit to the various recipient entities to ensure that the questionnaires were 
filled in, completed and retrieved by a team made up of  the writer and an assistant 
covering as my entities as possible on each appointed day. 
 
5.5 Scope of the study 
The scope of this study is limited to compliance, and has to do specifically with the 
extent to which factors such as goal achievement by governmental or public sector 
organizations; monitoring of procurement practitioners and familiarity of rules by 
procurement practitioners influence compliance with the new public procurement Act, 
Act 663 during the implementation of the public procurement reforms in Ghana. 
 
5.6 Measurement construct 
Likert-type items on a 1-7 scale with end points ‘Strongly disagree’ and ‘Strongly agree’ 
were used as the response anchor in this study. The items are described in Table 1 with 
the corresponding reliability measures (Cronbach alpha coefficient). 
 
5.6.1 Goal achievement (Goal) 
This describes organizational objectives/goal by the various governmental organizations/ 
procurement entities which they seek to achieve. Goal achievement was measured by a 
scale of three items capturing the degree to which organizational goal is achieved. The 
scale shows satisfactory reliability with α=0.74. 
 
5.6.2 Monitoring (Monit) 
Monitoring was measured by a scale of three items capturing the degree to which the 
procurement practitioners (or the procurement entity) were monitored by their superiors 
or the various oversight bodies such as the tender committee, the procurement Board 
and/or internal or external monitors and evaluators. The scale shows satisfactory 
reliability with α=0.74. 
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Table1: Items representing different scales and reliability estimates. 
scale Description of items 
Goal,  
3 items,    α=0.74 
 
Goal1: The available procurement rules facilitate the 
achievement of our organization objectives. 
Goal2:  Our organization rules match with the applied 
procurement regulations. 
Goal3:  It is easy to achieve organization objectives while 
adhering to the available procurement rules. 
 
Monit,  
3 items,    α=0.74 
 
Monit1:  We are frequently inspected to see if we adhere to the 
established procurement rules as stipulated by Act 663. 
Monit2:  Our supervisors show much interest to see if we are 
complying strictly with the established rules and regulations. 
Monit3:  Our supervisors ensure that we follow and comply 
with the established rules in our day-to-day procurement 
functions. 
Fami,  
3 items,    α=0.59 
 
Fam1:  Only those familiar with procurement rules in this office 
are allowed to carry out procurement tasks. 
Fam2:  Procurement work functions in this office are done only 
by practitioners with academic or professional qualifications. 
Fam3:  The procurement knowledge base of other players 
(suppliers, other buyers etc) of the rules and regulations of Act 
663 has an impact on procurement functions organized in this 
office. 
  
Comp,  
3 items*,    α=0.59 
 
Comp1: Goods and services are purchased through the use of 
imprests. 
Comp2:  Goods and services purchased are not delivered on 
time. 
Comp3:  Purchased goods and services are not recorded on 
time (late recording of deliveries).  
 
  
 
* Likert-type scale from 1-5 with endpoints ‘not at all’ and ‘most frequently’ 
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5.6.3 Familiarity (Fami)   
 Familiarity was measured by a scale of three items capturing the extent to which 
procurement practitioners were familiar and knowledgeable with the provisions of the 
procurement rules and regulations. The scale shows satisfactory reliability with α=0.59. 
 
5.6.4 Compliance (Comp)  
Compliance was measured by a scale of three items capturing the extent to which the 
procurement practitioners and/or procurement entities comply with the procurement rules 
and regulations. The scale shows satisfactory reliability with α=0.59. 
 
5.6.5 Controlled variable: (Intraop)  
A controlled variable, intraorganizational pressure which is one of the items referring to 
‘the decisions and actions of other staff in our organization have impact on our effort to 
adhere to the established procurement rules’ was added for purposes of analysis of  the 
data set. 
 
5.7 Discriminant validity of independent variables 
Discriminant validity was assessed by factor analyzing all the nine items composing the 
goal achievement by organizations, monitoring of public procurement practitioner’s 
behavior and familiarity to public procurement rules. Three factors were identified: 
Factor 1 appears to represent goal achievement, factor 2 reflects monitoring, and factor 3 
represents familiarity with procurement rules. The varimax rotated factor-loading matrix 
is presented in Table 2. 
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Table2. Factor analysis. Three-factor principal axis solution with varimax rotation for 
goal achievement (Goal), monitoring (Monit), and familiarity to procurement rules 
(Fami). The corresponding definitions of the items are given in Table 1.  
 
Items 
 
Factor 1 
 
Factor 2 
 
 
Factor 3 
Monit 3  
Monit 2 
Monit 1 
 
 0.838  
 0.874  
 0.741 
 
  0.216   
  0.223   
  0.078 
  0.203  
  0.239 
 -0.029 
 
Goal 3 
Goal 2  
Goal 1 
 0.189  
 0.113  
 0.429 
  0.847  
  0.843  
  0.549 
 
  -0.035  
   0.122   
   0.279 
 
 
Fami 1 
Fami 2 
Fami 3 
 
 0.144 
 0.220 
-0.032 
  0.085 
-0.115 
  0.258 
  0.774 
  0.742 
  0.677 
 
 
 
In summary, this chapter discussed the methodology adopted in the study of the problem 
at hand: ‘how organizational goal achievement, familiarity with procurement rules and 
monitoring of procurement practitioners influence compliance with the new public 
procurement Act, Act 663 during the implementation of the public procurement reforms 
program in Ghana’. The next chapter goes further to explain the research framework used 
by developing a conceptual model to help in the formulation of the hypotheses for this 
study. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter was preceded by the methodology that was used in the study and now looks 
at the research framework that underpins the study at hand by developing a conceptual 
model to help in modeling the research question and the development of appropriate 
hypothesis to be tested. The key theory that forms the basis of the research framework is 
the Principal-agent theory. The Principal-agent theory deals with the relationship between 
two actors: a Principal and the Agent who makes decisions or takes actions on behalf of 
the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1988, 1989; Bergen et al., 1992). 
An agent acting on behalf of a principal may be forced to comply with the laid down 
rules since the actor assumes that he/she may be sanctioned for non-compliance or 
rewarded for compliance.  
 
A public procurement practitioner therefore acting on behalf of the government of Ghana 
(principal) is enforced to comply with the regulatory regime of the new public 
procurement Act, Act 663 since the inability to comply may result in the agent being 
sanctioned as mandated by the law. However according to Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
the agent will not always act in the best interest of the principal as each of them is a 
utility maximizer. In conceptualizing this into the study at hand it is expected that 
monitoring the behavior of the agent will lead to the agent conforming and thereby 
helping in the realization of the objectives of the principal. This poses the question as to  
whether the monitoring of a public procurement practitioner’s behavior will lead to 
him/her being in compliance with the procurement rule or not?   The achievement of the 
agent’s objective and/or goal and that of the principal need to be in congruence so that in 
the achievement of the goals of the agent there will not be goal conflict. This also poses 
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the question as to whether an agent (here the public organization/procurement entity) can 
be compliant and still be able to achieve its organizational goal?  In relating the above to 
the study at hand it is expected according to theory (Gelderman et al., 2006) that 
familiarity or how knowledgeable procurement practitioners are of the rules and 
regulations of the procurement Act coupled with the adoption of the necessary 
monitoring mechanism stipulated by the procurement Act will help influence the way 
practitioners behave in terms of compliance with the provisions of the Public 
procurement Act, Act 663. 
 
6.2 Conceptual Model  
A conceptual model to help in the illustration and explanation of compliance with the 
public procurement Act, Act 663 is shown in figure 4. It shows how the hypothesized 
variables impact on the compliance with the public procurement Act, Act 663.  
 
The framework posits that goal achievement by governmental/public sector organizations 
contributes positively to compliance. In other words, there is a positive relationship 
between goal achievement and compliance. The model also predicts that 
individuals/entities comply more with the rules when monitoring mechanisms are 
instituted. Monitoring therefore has a positive relationship with compliance. The model 
also predicts that intra-organizational pressure which has to do with the decisions and 
action of other staff within the organization is expected to have a negative impact on the 
effort of procurement practitioners to comply with the Procurement Act.   
 
6.3 Hypotheses 
In the formulation of the hypotheses for this study, the key theoretical framework that 
was used is the Principal-agent theory. The Principal-agent theory models the relationship 
between a principal who delegates work to an agent who performs that work (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1988, 1989, Bergen et al., 1992).  
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Figure 4: Conceptual model44 for the explanation of compliance with the public 
procurement Act, Act 663, (Adapted from Gelderman et al., 2006). 
 
 
Goal achievement +
Monitoring                   +                           
Familiarity                      +
Intraorganizational      -
pressure*                                                       
Compliance with Act 663
 
 
 
*Intra-organizational pressure is used as a controlled variable referring to the item: ‘the decisions 
and actions of other staff in our organization have impact on our efforts to adhere to the established 
procurement rules. 
 
                                                 
44
 Adapted from Gelderman et al., 2006. 
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6.3.1 Assessing the relationship between organizational goal 
achievement and compliance 
In public procurement, the procurement practitioner is the agent and acts on behalf of the 
principal, who is the government of the Ghana. The public procurement entity of any 
public sector organization therefore acts on behalf of the central government in realizing 
the goals and objectives of that organization. The goals and objectives of the procurement 
entity could be in conflict with what the reform program seeks to achieve or the other 
way, the goals and objectives of the public sector organization could be in conflict with 
that of the procurement reforms thereby making it difficult for the organization to achieve 
its goal while adhering to the rules and regulations of the public procurement law, and 
thereby making compliance with the rules a problem. It is therefore important to find out 
if in trying to achieve organizational goals a public sector organization may or may not 
comply with the tenets of the rules of the public procurement Act, Act 663 of the reform 
program. Based on this reasoning the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
• H1:  There is a positive correlation between organizational goal achievement 
and compliance with public procurement rules. 
 
6.3.2 Assessing the relationship between familiarity and compliance 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that both the principal and agent are motivated by 
their own self-interest when entering into contractual relationship. Douma and Schreuder 
(2002) argued that most economic models are centered on ‘self –interest’ which has to do 
with goal conflict, meaning that each party wants to maximize profits or utility for 
themselves only. However, Mitnick (1976) argued that principal-agent relationships need 
not always be commercial profit maximization but could also be for social goals where a 
principal would seek support from an agent to improve a social community. In relating 
this to  public procurement functions, the principal being the central government can be 
said to be mandating its agent here the procurement practitioner to act on its behalf by 
influencing the community in which the public sector organization is situated through the 
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adoption of socially responsible governmental purchasing, value for money and efficient 
procurement practices. But there is the assumption that the principal employs the services 
of the agent under the condition of incomplete information. Though the principal may 
have some information about the agent in terms of the agent’s characteristics and 
capabilities, the principal’s knowledge about the agent is limited and incomplete. Douma 
and Schreuder (2002) termed this hidden information or adverse selection. For example, 
the agent may claim to possess certain skills and/or abilities where the principal cannot 
verify completely. In relating this to the study, the public procurement practitioner may 
not be knowledgeable or familiar with the public procurement rules, regulations and 
procedures in order to perform his/her duties as mandated by the principal. It’s assumed 
that the lack of knowledge or familiarity with the procurement rules could negatively 
affect the agents ability to comply with the laid down procurement rules and regulations. 
Based on this reasoning, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
• H3: There is a positive correlation between familiarity with procurement rules 
and compliance with public procurement rules. 
 
 
6.3.3 Assessing the relationship between monitoring and compliance 
It is assumed that when the principal has sufficient information to verify the behavior of 
the agent, the agent is more likely to behave in the interest of the principal (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Rokkan and Buvik, 2003). Eisenhardt (1989) therefore argued that there is the need 
for a governance mechanism that limits the agent’s self-serving behavior while Jensen 
(1983) had earlier described this governance mechanism as a monitoring device. Rokkan 
and Buvik (2003) in their study of monitoring and free riding behavior in voluntary retail 
chain, stated that ‘the central chain office (the principal) can potentially curb free riding 
behavior (opportunism) by investing in monitoring arrangements that enable it to verify 
the behavior of members (agents) and with information about members behavior can 
ultimately sanction members that free ride and/or reward members that comply with their 
obligations’. In relating this to the study at hand, it can be assumed that the public 
procurement practitioners who are agents of the central government (principal) when 
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monitored will comply more with the various provisions of the public procurement Act, 
Act 663 than if not monitored. The sanctioning of practitioners who do not comply and 
rewarding of those who comply with the rules help increase compliance rates. Blau and 
Scott (1962) and Murray and Heide (1998) also  argued that in addition to the incentive 
effect of monitoring, monitoring arrangements can also increase member compliance 
because the monitoring process in itself may place uncomfortable social pressure on the 
agent. Based on this reasoning, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
• H2: There is positive correlation between monitoring of practitioners behavior 
and compliance with public procurement rules. 
 
In summary, this chapter synthesized the available literature and theory from the 
preceding chapters to develop a conceptual model of the problem at hand which 
subsequently helped in the formulation of the hypotheses to be tested in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
EMPIRICAL TESTS AND RESULTS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter made use of the literature and theory in the preceding chapters to 
develop a conceptual model which subsequently helped in the formulation of the 
hypotheses for this study. This chapter therefore goes further to estimate the model, test 
the hypotheses formulated and presents the results and findings of the study. It consists 
of: model estimation; empirical results from the multiple regression analysis; and a brief 
interpretation of the results based on the various quantitative analyses of the data 
collected for the study of the problem at hand. 
 
7.2 Model estimation 
The following Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multiple regression model was specified to 
test the research hypotheses: 
 
           
                         Comp = β0 + β1Goal + β2 Monit +β3 Fami + έ 
 
 
Where Comp which is the dependent variable is compliance with procurement rules; and 
the independent variables are: Goal, for organizational goal achievement, Monit, for 
monitoring of public procurement practitioners’ behavior, Fami, for familiarity of public 
procurement rules and έ is the error term. The error term represents the failure to include 
all the factors related to the dependent variable in the model. 
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7.3 Empirical results 
 
Table 3 Results of multiple regression analysis 
(Dependent variable: Compliance (Comp)) 
 
Independent variables 
 
 
Unstandardized 
coefficients  
 
 
Standardized 
coefficients 
 
T-value 
 
Constant (  β0 ) 
 
 
 2.780* 
 
 
 
 4.60 
 
Goal ( β1 )  
 
 
 0.218* 
 
 0.330 
 
 2.43 
 
Monit ( β2 )  
 
 
 0.063 
 
 0.090 
 
 0.64 
 
Fami (  β3 )  
 
 0.075** 
 
 0.164 
 
 
 1.29 
 
Intraop ( β4 )         
 
-0.103* 
 
 
-0.229 
 
-1.90 
 
R2 = 0.25          (R2adj = 0.196),          F (4, 53) = 4.483* 
  * Significant at   p<0.05 (two-tailed) 
** Significant at   p<0.10 (one-tailed) 
 
To test the hypotheses an OLS-regression model was estimated incorporating the effect 
of Goal achievement, Monitoring of public procurement practitioners, and Familiarity of 
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procurement rules on compliance with the public procurement Act, Act 663. Intra-
organizational pressure defined by the item: ‘the decisions and actions of other staff in 
our organization have impact on our effort to adhere to the established procurement rules’ 
was included in the model as a controlled variable. Appendix B illustrates the correlation 
matrix of the study. It shows the various variables with their corresponding Cronbach 
alpha, mean and standard deviation. Goal achievement and monitoring of public 
procurement practitioners behavior shows satisfactory reliability each with α=0.74 while 
familiarity with procurement rules and compliance shows an alpha (α) value of 0.59 
(approximately 0.6) each. Table 3 gives the estimated parameters of the model. The 
overall goodness of fit of the model was assessed using the F-value and was found to be 
statistically significant at p<0.05 (F (4, 53) =4.48, p<0.05, R2 =0.25, R2 adj = 0.196)45. The 
goodness of fit of the model is very important because with multiple regressions, it is 
mandatory that all the predictors (independent variables) be taken onto account 
simultaneously to establish the statistical significance of the overall model (Churchill and 
Brown, 2004, pg. 601). The model is tested via F-statistic found in the ANOVA 
(appendix D) and in this study was found to be significant. The R2adj = 0.196 which is 
interpreted to mean that only 19.6% of the variance in the compliance-construct can be 
explained with the model and that other not-included variables have an additional impact 
on compliance. While R2 = 0.25, R2 is referred to as coefficient of multiple 
determination46  can also be interpreted as follows: it means that 25% of the variation in 
the dependent variable, Compliance is associated with variation in independent variables, 
Goal, Monit and Fami (though the results of the study shows that monitoring adds very 
little to improving the fit of the regression line). From Table 3, it can be inferred that 
there is association between the independent variables, Goal, Monit, Fami, Intrap and 
compliance: 
 
                                                 
45
 The R2 of 25 is within range reported in the extant literature (Rokkan and Buvik, 2003). The R2 of  this 
study is at or above the levels reported by, e.g., Provan and Skinner, 1989: 16% and Brown et al., 2000: 
14% although some studies have reported higher levels of explained variance ( Rokkan and Buvik, 
2003:29% and others e.g., Gundlach, 1999).   
46
 Coefficient of multiple determination: in multiple regression analysis, the proportion of the variation in 
the dependent variable that is explained or accounted for by the covariation in the independent variables 
(Churchil and Brown, 2004, pg. 604). 
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• A strong positive relationship between goal achievement and compliance at 
0.05 significance level (two-tailed) 
• A positive relationship between monitoring of public procurement 
practitioners’ behavior and compliance but not significant. 
• A strong positive relationship between familiarity of procurement rules and 
compliance at 0.10 significance level (one-tailed) 
• A strong negative relationship between intra-organizational pressure and 
compliance at 0.05 significance level (two-tailed) 
 
From the above analysis, the effect of goal achievement on compliance is therefore 
significant and positive (β1=0.22, p<0.05) in accordance with H1. There is also a positive 
and significant association between familiarity of rule and compliance as predicted by H3 
(β3=0.08, p<0.10). However, monitoring though having a positive association with 
compliance (β2=0.03) as predicted by H2 is not significant while intra-organizational 
pressure as expected has negative effect on compliance (β4 =-0.01, p<0.05). The resulting 
regression model is as follows: 
 
                      Comp = 2.78 + 0.22Goal + 0.06Monit +0.08Fami - 0.10Intraop + έ 
 
In interpreting the regression model above, the individual β coefficients corresponding to 
the predictor variables (independent variables) in the regression model can be interpreted 
as the average change in the appropriate predictor variable while holding the other 
predictor variables constant or unchanged. The following interpretations of the individual 
β coefficient are summarized below:      
• β1 = 0.22 indicates that on the average, an increase of  0.22 in Compliance 
(Comp) can be expected with a unit increase in goal achievement (Goal) if 
monitoring (Monit), familiarity of rule (Fami) and intra-organizational pressure 
are kept unchanged (i.e. constant) 
 
• β2 = 0.06 indicates that on the average, an increase of only 0.06 in Compliance 
(Comp) can be expected with a unit increase in monitoring  (Monit) if goal 
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achievement (Goal), familiarity of rule (Fami) and intra-organizational pressure 
(Intraop) are kept unchanged (i.e. constant) 
• β3 = 0.08 indicates that on the average, an increase of  0.08 in Compliance 
(Comp) can be expected with a unit increase in familiarity of rule (Fami) if  goal 
achievement (Goal), monitoring (Monit) and intra-organizational pressure 
(Intraop) are kept unchanged (i.e. constant) 
 
•  β4 = -0.10 indicates that on the average, a decrease of  0.10 in Compliance 
(Comp) can be expected with a unit increase in intra-organizational pressure 
(Intraop) when goal achievement (Goal), monitoring (Monit), and familiarity of 
rule (Fami) are kept unchanged (i.e. constant).  
 
In summary, this chapter made use of the Ordinary Least squares (OLS) multiple 
regression model to test the research hypotheses that was formulated based on the 
conceptual model developed from theory from preceding chapters. It presented the results 
from the various quantitative analyses and briefly interpreted the results and findings that 
were found in the study. The next chapter is the concluding chapter of this study and 
discusses the managerial implications of the findings, the limitations of the study and 
suggestions for further research. The concluding chapter also consists of a summary of 
the study that was undertaken. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter is the concluding part of this study consisting of the discussion and 
managerial implications; a summary of the study at hand; limitations of the study and 
suggestions for further research. The discussion is a follow-up to the previous chapters 
after looking at the problem of the study, collecting the data and testing the hypotheses. 
The outcome of the various analyses is therefore discussed including its managerial 
implication. The summary is a synopsis of the study and embodies what the study sought 
to find (the research problem); the key theory that was employed in the study; the key 
findings of the study and its practical/managerial implications; the chapter concludes 
finally by looking at the limitations of the study and suggestions for further research.  
 
8.2 Discussion and managerial implications  
In the extant literature on public procurement most of the literature has been devoted to 
regulatory issues; procurement processes and systems; corruption and transparency issues 
with very little on academic research with respect to compliance. Even the few literature 
on compliance issues have to do with government; donor assisted; bilateral or multilateral 
funding agencies’ assessment of public procurement reform programs in developing 
countries. Such assessments may not be academic in their scope and may be more 
qualitative lacking most often theoretical underpinnings because of their terms of 
reference and the uses those reports are put to. This study deviates from this main stream 
and contributes to the literature on compliance issues in public procurement in 
developing countries by addressing some of the key factors that influence compliance 
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such as: organizational goal achievement; monitoring of public procurement 
practitioner’s behavior, and familiarity of procurement rule and how these influence the 
extent of compliance. The study made use of the principal-agent theory as its basis in the 
formulation of the hypothesis and in the development of a conceptual model and found 
support for the hypothesis (HI, H2, and H3). Though all three variables were positive, the 
following two appeared to have a significant and positive influence on compliance: 
• organizational goal achievement 
• familiarity of rules by public procurement practitioners 
 
While a fourth variable that was included as a control variable was found to have a 
significant and negative association with compliance: 
• intra-organizational pressure 
 
The second variable, though having a positive association with compliance was not of 
much significance: 
• monitoring of public procurement practitioners’ behavior 
 
The monitoring of public procurement practitioners’ behavior though having a positive 
association with compliance with public procurement Act, Act 663 was found not to be 
having a strong influence. This could be explained from the principal-agent theory 
perspective where in some instances, monitoring actually have a negative influence on 
the behavior of agents (though in this study this influence was not negative) as 
documented by Rokkan and Buvik (2003)47. This is because agents may see the purpose 
and function of monitoring mechanisms as a signal of distrust causing the agent to 
devalue the agent-principal relationship (Rokkan and Buvik, 2003) and thereby 
influencing their output and performance and in this study their behavior towards 
compliance issues which could be one that may lack much enthusiasm. The argument 
                                                 
47
 Rokkan and Buvik (2003) in their study of  ‘Inter-firm cooperation and the problem of free riding 
behavior: an empirical study of voluntary retail chains’ proposed a negative association between the extent 
of monitoring and free riding behavior while an alternative proposition argued for a positive association 
based on Murrey and Heide (1998) and other researchers. The former proposition was found to be 
supported contrary to Murrey and Heide (1998), that monitoring decreases free riding behavior (Rokkan 
and Buvik, 1998). 
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therefore may be that though monitoring influences compliance, the thought, function 
and process of monitoring may not necessarily lead to a change in behavior of 
procurement practitioners to any significant level but rather because they are obliged to 
comply and the laws are being enforced with the necessary sanctions to be applied due to 
non-compliance, they have no choice than just to comply. This was evident from 
qualitative data in the form of interviews that was undertaken during the survey.  On the 
contrary,  though monitoring within the public service especially with respect to auditing 
is a regular feature mandated by the laws regulating public sector organizations’ 
performance, the thought of one being ‘monitored’ or ‘audited’ though could be 
‘distasteful’ or ‘distrustful’ as its usually a constitutional requirement may not necessarily 
influence behavior in the public service most especially when in practical terms the laws 
seems not to be enforced; sanctions are not accordingly applied; when there is so much 
bureaucracy, in-transparent dealings and  corruption coupled with weak judicial systems 
which do not promptly settle court cases, the thought, the purpose and function of 
monitoring may not change behavior to any significant level. The practical implication is 
that monitoring systems though good to be put in place since it helps determine 
deviations from the norm; measure performance; determine the extent of compliance and 
useful as a control measure it should be done in such a way as not to be perceived as 
‘distasteful’ and ‘distrustful’ since such perceptions do not help in any way in making 
practitioners comply with the procurement rules. Monitoring should also be seen as an 
opportunity for practitioners to learn corrective ways of doing things so as to improve on 
their efficiency and effectiveness in the conduct of their procurement functions.  
 
The two important variables that have a positive and significant influence on compliance 
are: organizational goal achievement and familiarity with procurement rules. Goal 
achievement for instance is expected to influence compliance to a very high extent and 
positively associated with compliance. The results undoubtedly confirm the H1 
hypothesis and the degree or extent it could influence compliance: an increase of 0.22 in 
compliance with a unit increase in goal achievement provided other factors are constant 
or remain unchanged. This implies that for public organizations in their effort to achieve 
their goals and objectives they can still be in the position to achieve a very high level of 
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compliance without undermining their own organizational goals and objectives. It means 
according to the principal-agent theory that the interest of both the principal and the agent 
can be served without the other (particularly the agent) serving only its interest at the 
expense of the principal. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that both principal and 
agent are motivated by their own self-interest when entering into contractual relationship. 
Douma and Schreuder (2002) argued that most economic model are centered on ‘self –
interest’ which has to do with goal conflict, meaning that each party wants to maximize 
profits or utility for themselves only. However, Mitnick (1976) argued that principal-
agent relationships need not always be commercial profit maximization but could also be 
for social goals where a principal would seek support from an agent to improve a social 
community. This will imply that both the agent and principal should have goals or 
objectives that are in common to their interests and that there is no goal conflict. It is 
therefore important that the agent and the principal should have goal congruence in order 
for both of them to be able to serve their interest. Rokkan and Buvik (2003) proposed that 
the lower the level of goal conflict (i.e. the higher the level of goal congruence) the less 
likely it is that the agent will behave in opposition to the interest of the principal. 
 
 In the public sector, the government delegates the public sector organizations to act on 
its behalf.  Programs, plans, policies and other developmental agendas are implemented 
on behalf of the government by these organizations and in such situations the goals and 
objectives of the government are not in anyway different from that of these public 
organizations and institutions. For example, government provides its citizens with formal 
education by delegating the provision of such a service to public educational institutions 
(schools, universities and colleges) and both the government (principal) and the 
educational institutions (agents) have a common goal or objective of providing education 
to the citizenry. In such an instance, there is goal congruence and it is expected that the 
agent (i.e. the educational institutions) will act in the best interest of their principal (i.e. 
the government) in the performance of their delegated functions. In such situations 
therefore it is understandable that the agents will not have problems in complying with 
the procurement laws so long as there is goal congruence and the public organizations 
and entities could still achieve their goals without having to compromise on complying 
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with the procurement laws and regulations. The above argument therefore explains the 
positive and significant influence of organizational goal on compliance with the public 
procurement law in this study. 
 
The familiarity with public procurement rules had a positive and a strong association with 
compliance as proposed by H2.  This shows that the need for knowledge and clarity of 
procurement rules is a very important factor in the extent or degree to which compliance 
can be achieved when public procurement reforms are being implemented. The success 
or failure of public procurement reforms in developing countries such as Ghana depends 
to some extent on the knowledge ability of the public procurement practitioners with 
respect to how familiar they are with the procurement rules and regulations. Knowledge 
of the procurement process, procedures, rules and regulations will in no doubt help in 
achieving compliance in public procurement reform programs. Gelderman et al, (2006) 
proved this assertion that: ‘familiarity with rules had a significant and positive influence 
to compliance’ confirming their earlier proposition. This imply that there is therefore the 
need to provide adequate training program to help equip procurement practitioners with 
the necessary knowledge of procurement processes, methods, rules and regulations so as 
to be able to efficiently carry out their procurement duties. This it is expected will help 
the practitioners to be able to comply with the provisions of the new public procurement 
Act, Act 663 since there is a strong and positive association between familiarity of rule 
and compliance. On the other hand, pressure brought to bear on procurement practitioners 
by other staff in the organization has been found to have a negative effect on compliance. 
This is captured as intra-organizational pressure which denotes the extent to which 
decisions and actions of other staff in the organization have impact on the efforts of 
procurement practitioners to adhere to the established procurement rules.  
 
The conceptual model proposed that intra-organizational pressure had a negative 
influence on compliance with the procurement rules and this assertion was confirmed by 
the results obtained in this study by the strong and negative association that intra-
organizational pressure had with compliance. The implication here is that as much as 
possible other staff in the organization/ procurement entity should do well not to let their 
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actions and decisions affect the procurement process in their organizations and that the 
procurement practitioners should be given the ‘free hand’ to take decisions and actions to 
allow the procurement system to function properly without any ‘duress’.     
 
 
8.3 Summary of the study 
This study sought to find out whether organizational goal achievement, familiarity with 
procurement rules and monitoring of procurement practitioners’ behavior influence 
compliance with the new public procurement Act, Act 663 during the implementation of 
the public procurement reforms program in Ghana. Most studies conducted on public 
procurement have been devoted to regulatory issues; procurement processes and systems; 
corruption and transparency issues with very little on academic research with respect to 
compliance. Even the few literature on compliance issues have to do with government; 
donor assisted; bilateral or multilateral funding agencies’ assessment of public 
procurement reform programs in developing countries. Such assessments may not be 
academic in their scope and are usually more qualitative lacking most often theoretical 
underpinnings because of their terms of reference and the uses those reports are put to. 
This study aims to fill some of this gap by identifying factors and variables for which a 
quantitative impact on compliance with the new Public Procurement Act, Act 663 can be 
measured. This was done coupled with the use of some qualitative insights to help fully 
assess, evaluate, explain, and describe the context of public procurement reforms in 
general and in Ghana in particular; review applicable theory, the Principal-agent theory; 
and the extant literature. This study therefore deviates from the main stream and 
contributes to the literature on compliance issues in public procurement in developing 
countries by looking not only at the qualitative aspect but also at the quantitative impact 
assessment of the procurement reform program in Ghana.  The study made use of the 
principal-agent theory as its key basis in the formulation of the applicable hypotheses.  
The Principal-agent theory deals with the relationship between two actors: a Principal and 
the Agent who makes decisions or takes actions on behalf of the principal (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1988, 1989; Bergen et al., 1992). The principal-agent 
relationship looks at the contractual relationship where one or more persons (the 
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principal(s)) engages another person(s) the agent to perform some service on their behalf 
involving the delegation of some decision making authority to the agent (Jensen and 
Meckling,1976). The principal-agent theory is very useful as a framework in the study of 
public procurement systems since it involves the delegation of procurement functions, 
tasks and decisions by the government (principal) to an agent (procurement practitioners 
and governmental purchasers).  
 
Public procurement is defined as the process by which large amounts of public funds are 
utilized by public entities to purchase goods and services from the private sector (Hunja, 
2003). It involves the acquisition of goods and/or services at the best possible total cost of 
ownership, in the right quantity, quality, time and place for use by government and public 
organizations via contracts. In trying to address weaknesses in its public procurement 
process, various governments in Ghana have passed several financial and legal 
instruments in the form of constitutional, legislative instruments, administrative 
instructions and financial circulars. It was until recently that it undertook to ‘overhaul’ its 
procurement systems and to embark on a new regulatory framework that seeks to regulate 
the procurement processes and functions in the public sector. This led to the enactment of 
the Public Procurement Act, Act 663 and the establishment of an ‘oversight’ body: the 
Public Procurement Board with the responsibility and authority to oversee all public 
procurement issues in the Ghanaian economy. Based on the available literature and 
theory and a factor analysis of a survey among fifty-eight, 58 (89.2% response rate) 
purchasing professionals and practitioners in the public sector of the Ghanaian economy 
using structured questionnaires to survey factors   leading to compliance with the new 
Public Procurement Law, Act 663. Three dimensions were found: organizational goal 
achievement; familiarity with procurement rule; monitoring of public procurement 
practitioner’s behavior and an additional factor which served as a controlled variable, 
inter-organizational pressure denoting the item ‘the decisions and actions of other staff in 
our organization have impart on our effort to adhere to the established procurement 
rules’. 
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The empirical findings indicate that both organizational goal achievement and familiarity 
with procurement rules have a positive, statistically significant impact on compliance. 
The managerial implication of this finding would be that educating and training public 
procurement practitioners will be an effective tool for increasing the compliance with the 
new Public Procurement Act, Act 663 within the public sector of the Ghanaian economy. 
Perhaps, even more impact can be expected by reconciling the effort that is made towards 
organizational goal achievement by avoiding organizational goal conflict. No significant 
impact could be established by monitoring mechanisms since monitoring is usually seen 
to be ‘distasteful’ and a sign of ‘distrust’ and that to be able to improve compliance (since 
it at least had a positive association with compliance) it is important to involve the 
procurement practitioners in the monitoring process and also by educating them on the 
purpose and usefulness of monitoring. This is to help them perceive monitoring not as a 
sign of ‘distrust and a distasteful process’ but as a useful mechanism to become more 
efficient and effective in the performance of one’s procurement functions, processes and 
duties.  
 
Inter-organizational pressure was also found to be negatively correlated with compliance 
and the implication is that procurement practitioners should be given the ‘free hand’ to 
take decisions and actions concerning their procurement functions and to as much as 
possible avoid other staff within the organizational from unnecessarily influencing their 
activities either through the decisions or actions of the other staff which negatively 
impact on their work. There is also the need for education for the various staffs of an 
organization to know the various roles that each has to play in helping achieve the goals 
and objectives of the organization and to be informed of how certain actions or decisions 
that they take negatively impact on the work of the procurement practitioners which may 
lead to non-compliance. 
 
8.4 Limitations of the study 
The current study is limited in its setting. The questionnaires were administered to 
procurement professionals mostly in the government ministries; public universities, 
colleges; hospitals and polyclinics; and some government owned companies which are 
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mostly located in the southern part of Ghana, which are more likely to comply than other 
governmental agencies in very remote parts of the country. Due also to time constraints 
and logistical complexities not all the over two hundred48  procurement entities in the 
Ghanaian public procurement system was fully covered and therefore a sample size of 
sixty-five (65) public procurement entities was made use of. Another limitation of this 
study is that it relies on the perception of respondents and not on an objective measurable 
data on compliance issues. Compliance based studies relying on the perceptions of 
respondents and not making use of an objective measurable data is expected to be limited 
in scope (Gelderman et al., 2006). 
 
8.5 Suggestions for further research  
This study relies on perception of respondents and it is worth noting that future research 
could combine perceptual data and objective measurable data on compliance issues such 
as: the percentage of open bidding procedures publicly advertised; percentage of 
contracts awarded; average number of days between invitation to bid and bid opening; 
percentage of responsive bids and the percentage of contracts awards publicly disclosed. 
This is because these metrics are very important indicators of: advertisement of bid 
opportunities; publication of awards; time for preparation of bids; bid acceptance, method 
of procurement which are all objective measurable indicators of compliance respectively. 
It could also include a sample of other kinds of respondents such as suppliers; civil 
society organizations concerned with corruption and transparency in government 
businesses; bilateral and multilateral donors. The explanatory variables and items of the 
underlying construct in this study were derived from publications on compliance (with 
some changes and adaptations to the questionnaires) with public procurement reform in 
Tanzania. Being a developing country like Ghana, some commonalities were therefore 
expected to be harnessed to form some basis of this research though some changes were 
done to the underlying construct to reflect the Ghanaian situation. In future studies a 
totally different approach could be adopted by making use of a variety of different 
                                                 
48
 The Public Procurement Board undertook an assessment of 213 procurement entities between August 
2006 and January 2007 but currently 1000 public sector organizations (ministries, departments and 
agencies) have been declared public procurement entities according to survey results obtained during the 
field trip to Ghana in the latter part of February 2008 to the early part of April 2008. 
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perspectives since compliance and non-compliance can be explained by a variety of 
perspectives (Van Snellenberg and Van de Peppel, 2002; Gelderman et al, 2006) some of 
which have been mentioned above. The explanatory variables used here such as: 
organizational goal achievement; familiarity of rule and monitoring could be 
supplemented with others such as sanctions; goal conflict; training; perceived 
inefficiency; rewards structures and supplier review just to mention a few. Future 
research therefore opens more opportunities for more in-depth study; uses of variables 
that are used to study compliance issues in other fields/disciplines49 and further 
contribution to the literature on compliance in public procurement especially in 
developing countries where not much research has been done in this field. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49
 Gelderman et al, (2006) proposes compliance research using compliance variables from other fields such 
as economic perspective on compliance which posited that individuals are likely to comply if the expected 
utility from non compliance exceeds the utility from engaging in legitimate activity (Becker, 1968); in 
psychology it is generally agreed that individual’s personal values influence their compliance behavior-
individuals tend to comply with the law to the extent that they perceive the law as appropriate and 
consistent with their internalized norms, criminal theorist contend individuals and firms weigh the risks 
involved in non-compliance before deciding to engage in such behaviors in terms of the severity of 
sanctions(Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999); psychology and sociology stresses the importance of socialization 
processes in affecting behavior as well as peer pressure and opinion; public choice theory argues that the 
perceived legitimacy and the fairness of procedures are critical determinants of compliance (Tyler, 1990). 
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APPENDIX A: List of public procurement entities forming the 
sample size of the study. 
No. 
 Public Procurement Entity Location 
1 Graphic Communication Group Accra 
2 Accra Metropolitan Authority Accra 
3 Cocoa Processing Company Accra 
4 Bank of Ghana Accra 
5 Ghana National Theatre Accra 
6 Social Security and National Insurance Trust Accra 
7 Environmental Protection Agency Accra 
8 Ministry of Local Government and Development              Accra 
9 Ministry of Women and Children Accra 
10 Ministry of Communication Accra 
11 Ministry of Water Resources, works and Housing Accra 
12 Ministry of Education Accra 
13 Ghana Education Service  Accra 
14 Presbyterian Boys Secondary School Accra 
15 Internal Revenue Service Accra 
16 Accra Training College Accra 
17 Achimota School Accra 
18 Achimota Hospital Accra 
19 Ghana Institute of Management & Public 
Administration 
Accra 
20 University of Ghana Accra 
21 Adabraka Polyclinic Accra 
22 Ghana Health Service Accra 
23 Ridge Hospital Accra 
24 Public Utility Regulatory Commission Accra 
25 Electoral Commission Accra 
26 Accra Psychiatric Hospital Accra 
27 Ministry of Forestry Accra 
28 Ghana Cocoa Board Accra 
29 Holy Trinity Cathedral Secondary School Accra 
30 Ghana Supply Company Limited Accra 
31 Public Works Department Accra 
32 Ministry of Trade & Industry Accra 
34 Ministry of Finance Accra 
35 Ghana Water Company Limited Accra 
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36 Public Services Commission Accra 
37 Kaneshie Polyclinic Accra 
38 Ghana Highways Authority Accra 
39 Accra Girls Secondary School Accra 
40 Bureau of Ghanaian Languages Accra 
 
 
No. Public Procurement Entity Location 
41 National Disaster Management Organization Accra 
42 Ghana Atomic Energy Commission Accra 
43 Institute of Professional Studies Accra 
44 Korle-Bu Hospital Accra 
45 Ministry of Roads and Transport Accra 
46 Department of Urban Roads Accra 
47 Accra Polytechnic Accra 
48 Tema Municipal Authority Accra 
49 Customs Excise and Preventive Service Accra 
50 Takoradi Polytechnic Takoradi 
51 Effia Nkwanta Hospital Takoradi 
52 Shama-Ahanta East Metropolitan Assembly  Sekondi 
Takoradi 
53 Takoradi Secondary School Takoradi 
54 Bompeh Secondary School Takoradi 
55 Sekondi College Sekondi 
56 University of Cape Coast Cape Coast 
55 Cape Coast Polyclinic Cape Coast 
56 Cape Coast Municipal Assembly Cape Coast 
57 Cape Coast Regional Hospital Cape Coast 
58 Ghana National College Cape Coast  
59 Kwame Nkrumah University of Science & Technology Kumasi 
60 Kumasi Metropolitan Authority Kumasi 
61 Komfo Anokye Teaching Hospital Kumasi 
62 Kumasi Polytechnic Kumasi 
63 Kumasi Academy Kumasi 
64 Internal Audit Service Accra 
65 Ministry of Justice Accra 
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APPENDIX B: Correlation matrix. 
 
 
Variables 
 
Mean 
 
Standard 
deviation 
 
Comp 
 
 
Goal 
 
 
Monit 
 
 
Fami 
 
 
Comp 
 
4.229 
 
0.596 
 
 
1.0 
   
 
Goal 
 
 
5.776 
 
0.916 
 
 
0.406** 
 
1.0 
  
 
Monit 
 
 
5.862 
 
0.854 
 
 
0.266* 
 
0.470** 
 
1.0 
 
 
Fami 
 
 
5.189 
 
1.310 
 
 
0.288* 
 
0.265* 
 
0.327* 
 
1.0 
 
N 
 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
 
58 
 
58 
 
58 
 
58 
 
α 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
0.59 
 
 
0.74 
 
0.74 
 
0.59 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed)                 p<0.01 
  * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed)                 p<0.05 
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APPENDIX C: Model summary. 
 
 
Model 
 
 
R 
 
R Square 
 
Adjusted R 
Square 
 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .503a .253 .196 .53455 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                              Change Statistics 
 
 
Model 
 
R Square  
Change 
F Change         df1         df2 Sig. F Change 
1 .253 4.483           4          53              .003 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), The decisions and actions of other staff in our organization 
have impacts on our efforts to adhere to the established procurement rules, Fami, 
Goal, Monit 
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APPENDIX D: ANOVAb. 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 
 
 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
 
df 
 
Mean Square 
 
      F 
 
  Sig. 
 
1 Regression 
 
 
Residual 
 
Total 
          
 
 
 
 
5.124 
 
 
15.145 
 
20.268 
 
4 
 
 
53 
 
57 
 
1.281 
 
 
.286 
 
4.483 
 
.003a 
 
 
 
 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), The decisions and actions of other staff in our organization 
have impacts on our efforts to adhere to the established procurement rules, Fami, 
Goal, Monit 
b. Dependent Variable: COMP 
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APPENDIX E: Coefficients a 
 
 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
            
          
 
           Model 
 
      B 
 
Std. Error 
 
  Beta 
 
 
 
 
 
       t 
 
 
 
 
 
Sig. 
 
1 ( Constant) 
 
Goal 
 
       Monit 
 
       Fami 
 
       Intraop 
 
2.780 
 
  .215 
 
  .063 
 
  .075 
 
 -.103 
 
 
 
 
.604 
 
.088 
 
.098 
 
.058 
 
.054 
 
 
 
 .330 
 
 .090 
 
 .164 
 
-.229 
 
 4.602 
 
 2.431 
 
   .644 
 
 1.288 
 
-1.905 
 
.000 
 
.018 
 
.522 
 
.203 
 
.062 
 
 
 
 
Collinearity Statistics 
 
 
 
 
Model 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
 
1 (Constant) 
                               
                                   Monit 
 
                                   Fami 
 
                                   Intraop 
 
.765 
 
.717 
 
.872 
 
.973 
 
 
1.308 
 
1.395 
 
1.147 
 
1.028 
 
a. Dependent Variable: COMP 
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APPENDIX F: Structured questionnaire for procurement entities  
 
 
 
RESEARCH PROJECT ON PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
REFORMS IN GHANA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SURVEY ON FACTORS LEADING TO COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LAW 
 
 
 
 
 
MOLDE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE 
P.O.BOX 2110 
6402 MOLDE NORWAY 
 
TLF: +47 71214000   FAX: 4771214100 
 
www.himolde.no 
 
Email:  
 richard.glavee-geo@himolde.no 
 
             
 
 glaveegeo@yahoo.com 
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Dear respondent, 
 
I am conducting this survey for my Msc thesis on Public Procurement Reforms in 
Ghana and your response is very much important. 
 
It will take a few minutes to complete the questionnaires by circling or ticking the 
appropriate response that best describes your views and be assured that this survey 
will not be used for any other purpose than what it is intended-Msc thesis research. 
 
Therefore, information provided will be very confidential and no individual 
respondent will be identified. Answers to the questionnaires will be combined with 
others and used for statistical analysis and discussion within the Msc thesis research 
work.  
 
I will be very grateful for a timely response to the questionnaires as these are very 
important to this research project. 
 
Thanks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RICHARD GLAVEE-GEO 
 
MOLDE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE 
POSTBOKS 2110, 6402 MOLDE 
NORWAY 
 
TEL. +47 970 13 480 
 
Richard.glavee-geo@himolde.no 
 
 
glaveegeo@yahoo.com 
 
 
 
 
 
 82 
 
A. Please circle the number that represents your views regarding the following statements. 
Circle once for each statement. 
                            1=strongly disagree                                    2=disagree    
                            3=partly disagree                                        4=don’t know 
                            5=partly agree                                             6=agree 
                      7=strongly agree 
 
 
1.Familarity with procurement rules and    regulations is a basic 
requirement for the work function in this office  
 
2.Only those familiar with procurement rules in this office are allowed 
to carry out procurement tasks 
 
3.I have basic knowledge about the objectives of the established 
procurement rules as stipulated by the new procurement law-ACT 663 
 
4.Procurement work functions in this office is done only by 
practitioners with academic or professional qualifications 
 
5.Applicable procurement rules are clearly stated and easily 
understood  
 
6.Training programs are frequently organized for the staff of this office 
on procurement related courses 
 
7.Staff of this office frequently participate in procurement training 
programs to increase our knowledge of the rules and regulations of 
procurement as stipulated by ACT 663 
 
8.The procurement knowledge base of other players(suppliers, other 
buyers, etc) of the rules and regulations of ACT 663 has an impact on 
procurement functions organized in this office  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1     2         3         4         5         6      7 
  
 
 
 1     2         3         4         5         6      7 
  
 
 
 1     2         3         4         5         6      7 
      
 
 
 
1      2         3         4         5         6       7 
  
 
 
1      2         3         4         5         6      7 
     
 
1      2         3         4         5         6       7 
      
 
 
1       2         3         4         5         6      7 
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B                                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
1=strongly disagree        2=disagree    
3=partly disagree           4=don’t know 
5=partly agree                6=agree 
7=strongly agree 
 
 
1. We provide extensive information regarding our procurement 
practice to our supervisors 
 
2.We focus our reports  along  established rules and regulations as 
stipulated by ACT 663 
 
3.We are frequently asked to report our procurement performance 
 
4.We frequently receive directives as to how to carry out our 
procurement duties 
 
5.We are frequently inspected to see if we adhere to the established 
procurement rules as stipulated by ACT  
663 
 
6.Our supervisors show much interest to see if we are complying 
strictly with the established rules and regulations 
 
7. Our supervisors ensure that we follow and comply with the 
established rules in our day-to-day procurement functions   
 
8.We are assessed based on the reported procurement performance 
 
9.Performance reports are verified through physical check ups 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
We undergo very frequent inspection to check if:- 
 
10.Proforma invoice is used to make purchases 
 
11.Purchases are made only after being approved by the relevant 
authorities 
 
12.We ensure timely delivery of procured goods and services 
 
13.We keep record of goods and services received without delay 
 
14.We apply proper storage methods to prevent damage and pilfering 
 
15.We have a feeling that we are constantly being observed by our 
supervisors 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
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C 
 
 
1.workers in our organization are usually sanctioned for not complying 
with procurement rules 
 
2.Sanctions are usually effected immediately after the violation of the 
rules are detected 
 
3.Sanctions are usually effected in privacy 
 
4.The reasons why employees are sanctioned upon violation of the laid 
down rules are made known to them 
 
5.The stipulated sanctions are known by the employees 
 
6.Penalties stipulated in the procurement law leads to fear of the 
violation of the procurement rules and regulations 
 
7.Practitioners weighs the benefits against the negative outcomes of  
not complying with the procurement rules 
 
 
 
 
D 
 
 
 
 
 
1.Adherence to organization specific directives entails the breach of 
procurement 
 
2.The available procurement rules facilitate the achievement of our 
organization objectives 
 
3.Our organization has been given conflicting objectives 
 
4.Our organization rules match with the applied procurement 
regulations 
 
5.It is easy to achieve organization objectives while adhering to the 
available procurement rules 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1=strongly disagree        2=disagree    
3=partly disagree           4=don’t know 
5=partly agree                6=agree 
7=strongly agree 
 
 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1=strongly disagree        2=disagree    
3=partly disagree           4=don’t know 
5=partly agree                6=agree 
7=strongly agree 
 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
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E 
 
 
 
 
 
1.Our organization can accurately predict the procurement 
performance of other actors and players within the organization for the 
coming fiscal year 
 
2.We are also aware that other procurement actors are able to adapt 
easily to changes of procurement rules and regulations 
 
3. The decisions and actions of other staff in our organization have 
impacts on our efforts to adhere to the established procurement rules. 
 
 
  
 
 
F 
 
 
 
 
1.The achievement of organizational goal influence our procurement 
practice 
 
2.The achievement of  organization’s goal is assigned the highest 
priority 
 
3.It is difficult to achieve organization’s goal without undermining 
others 
 
4.Pressure from other interested parties influence our compliance 
behavior with the laid down rules 
 
 
5.Procurement transactions  made outside our department create 
compliance challenges with the implemented rules 
 
6.Organizational goals are clearly defined 
 
7.Achieving organizational objectives is given much emphasis 
compared to achieving or complying with the procurement rules 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1=strongly disagree        2=disagree    
3=partly disagree           4=don’t know 
5=partly agree                6=agree 
7=strongly agree 
 
 
 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
 
1=strongly disagree        2=disagree    
3=partly disagree           4=don’t know 
5=partly agree                6=agree 
7=strongly agree 
 
 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7 
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G   From the mentioned procurement situations, please indicate 
the extent of occurrence (according to your perception) of each 
anomaly by circling the appropriate number.  
 
 
 
 
 
1.Goods and services are purchased without proper authority 
 
2.Goods and services are purchased through proforma invoices 
 
3.Goods and services are purchased through the use of imprests 
 
4.Goods and services purchased are not delivered on time  
 
5.Damaged or lost of goods 
 
6.Purchased goods/services not recorded on time(late recording of 
deliveries) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H Please complete the following statements by ticking(or filling) 
the appropriate (or blank) box in each  and also the corresponding 
blanks 
 
1.Please indicate your gender 
 
2.Tick the appropriate age range that represent you 
 
 
 
 
3. How long have you been working in the current position? 
 
4. How long have been working in this organization? 
 
5. How many employees work for this organization? 
 
6. Are you a registered member of any orgnization? 
 
7.If yes, name the professional body to which you are a registered 
member and the category of your membership 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1= most frequently      2= frequently    
3= I don’t know           4=less frequently 
5= not all 
 
 
 
 
 
1         2         3         4         5          
 
 
1         2         3         4         5          
 
 
1         2         3         4         5          
 
1         2         3         4         5          
 
 
1         2         3         4         5          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Female_________         Male_________ 
 
Below 30_____,               31-40_______,  
 
 41-50________,              above50______ 
 
 
 
________________________(Years) 
 
 
________________________(Years) 
 
 
 
Yes_________          No______________ 
 
__________________________________ 
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APPENDIX G: Unstructured questionnaire for the Public 
Procurement Board 
 
1. Briefly explain how procurement functions were conducted prior to the coming 
into force of the Public Procurement Act 2003(Act 663). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. The Public Procurement Act 2003 (Act 663) was a bill given Presidential assent on 
31st December 2003. When exactly did it become a law and what was its effective 
date of implementation? 
 
 
 
 
 
3. How many Public procurement entities are there within the Ghanaian economy? 
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4. Could you please make a list of some of these entities according to the following? 
(Separate sheet to be provided for response) 
 
A. Central management agencies/ministries 
 
B. Subverted organizations 
 
c. State owned enterprises 
 
 
d. Public universities/polytechnic 
 
 
      e. Public schools (senior secondary schools and teacher training colleges) 
 
f. Public hospitals/Polyclinics 
 
 
 
5. The law stipulates that each procurement entity should have a tender committee. 
In your inspection and monitoring activities by the PPA would you say this 
provision is being complied with? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. In your opinion do you think the thought of inspection by the practitioners of the 
various entities by the PPA has any influence on their behavior to comply with the 
rules and regulations? 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Explain in your opinion the thought of inspection by the practitioners of the 
various entities by the PPA as having any influence on their behavior with respect to 
opportunism?    
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8. according to the Act 663, a procurement entity shall promptly publish notice of 
procurement contract awards to the public. How often in your opinion do the 
various entities comply with this provision of the law? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. according to Act 663, the Auditor-General shall conduct annual audits of the 
procurement activities of the entities and shall furnish copies of reports on the 
audits to the PPA upon request from the PPA. How often has such request been 
made by the PPA? 
 
 
 
 
 
10. How would you rate the enforcement of the rules and regulations of Act 663? 
 
 
 
 
11. Would you say the laws are enforced to the latter with respect to complying with 
the provisions of the law? 
 
 
 
 
12. What would you say in your opinion should be done to make compliance of the 
law by the various entities a must? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13. In your opinion what do you think are the reasons for the high compliance rate 
with respect to some entities? 
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14. In your opinion what do you think are some of the reasons for the low 
compliance rate with respect to some entities? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15. In your opinion how knowledgeable are the procurement practitioners with 
respect to the procurement rules and regulations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16. in your opinion how knowledgeable are the suppliers, contractors and 
consultants with respect to the procurement rules and regulations? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17. How do you think the knowledge gap among the various practitioners should be 
closed? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18. In your opinion do you think the knowledge gap about the provisions of the law 
has an influence on the rate of compliance by the various entities? If so, in what 
ways do you think they influence compliance 
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